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I.

INTRODUCTION

Path dependence and critical junctures refer to decisive choices and
events that prompt future trajectories, which are difficult to reverse
because the progression of the political or institutional consequence
involves entrenched behavior, anteceding determinations, and an
elevated cost of altering course. 1 Path dependent methodology has been
applied to diverse topics, such as economic behavior, party system
dynamics, the incorporation of labor movements, and implementation of
legislative agendas. 2 This article considers how the two primal riskaverse post-9/11 assumptions-that there was a global al-Qaeda
network intent on perpetrating numerous catastrophic terror attacks and
that severe psychological interrogation methods were essential for
3
prying details of plots from suspected terrorists to prevent those attacks
-initiated a path dependent process that resulted in a rampant violation
of human rights on suspected terrorists, combatants, and innocent
4
people, both in and out of war zones. Residing between the two causal
premises and the result was the intervening variable of advisory memos
that rationalized illicit interrogation practices5 with loopholes to make
1. RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DA YID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: CRITICAL
JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 27-29
(2002); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251-53 (2000).
2. Pierson, supra note 1, at 251-54.
3. Robert Bejesky, A Rational Choice Reflection on the Balance Among Individual
Rights, Collective Security, and Threat Portrayals Between 9/11 and the Invasion of Iraq,
18 BARRY L. REV. 31, 34-43 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection];
Robert Bejesky, The Utilitarian Rational Choice of Interrogation from Historical
Perspective, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 327, 330-32 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Utilitarian
Rational Choice].
4. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 386-91; Robert Bejesky,
Pruning Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58
LOY. L. Rev. 821, 823-28 (2012) [hereinafter Bejesky, Pruning]; Robert Bejesky, Closing
Gitmo: The Epiphany Approach to Habeas Corpus During the Military Commissions
Circus, 7-10, 20-25 (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Bejesky, Epiphany Approach];
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, A National Security Agenda, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 829, 835
(2010) (speaking of the Bush Administration's interrogation techniques and noting that
"[ c]hoices made by earlier administrations are difficult to reverse abruptly, if at all, and as a
result new approaches evolve slowly.").
5. See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogations, 66
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legal restraints inapplicable. 6
Yet if one discards the premises, signified by the reality that the
first terrorist attack since 9/11 occurred at the 2013 Boston Marathon
when two bombs exploded and killed three Americans and injured
dozens more, 7 there has been virtually no credible evidence of sleeper
cells, realistic plots, or preparation for an attack, 8 and that wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq were not persuasively related to imminent threats
inside American borders; legal advisory memoranda endowed
government interrogation orders with a facade of legitimacy even as

OHIO ST. L.J. 1231 (2005); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Responses to the Ten Questions, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 5127, 5132 (2010) [hereinafter O'Connell, Responses] (stating that "the
memo on the Geneva Conventions and other torture memos are replete with errors,
erroneous reasoning, omissions, and illogic," and the sole plausible "explanation for the
shockingly poor quality of the memos ... is that the authors intended to reach conclusions
the law did not support."); see also Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to
Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 855-61 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 348 (2004); Neal K. Katya} & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002);
Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(2002).
6. Linda M. Keller, ls Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 521, 551 (2005)
(opining that the advice was tantamount to "the power to commit genocide, to sanction
slavery, to promote apartheid, to license summary execution."); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks,

War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age
of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 682 (2004) (noting that "lawyers for the Bush
administration went from the legitimate conclusion that the Geneva Conventions cannot
easily be applied to many modem conflicts, to the disingenuous and flawed conclusion that
there were therefore no legal constraints at all on U.S. interrogation practices.").
7. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Are We Safer from Terrorism? No, But We Can Be, 28 YALE L.
& Pol'y REv. 419, 419 (2010) (noting that there were no attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11);
Palash R. Ghosh, Boston Marathon Bombing: A Timeline Of Terrorist Attacks on US
Targets Since 9/11, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.ibtimes.com/boston-marathon-bombing-timeline-terrorist-attacks-us-targets911-l l 93485?ft=k82h2 (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
8. Ian S. Lustick, Fractured Fairy Tale: The War on Terror and the Emperor's New
Clothes, 16 MrNN. J. INT'L L. 335, 338 (2007); The Editorial Board, Indisputable Torture,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
16,
2013),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/ 17/opinion/indisputable-torture-ofprisoners.html?ref=extraordinaryrendition&_r=O (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (stating that a
recent "independent, nonpartisan panel's examination of the interrogation and detention
programs" implemented by the Bush Administration found violations of international law
and stated that there was "no firm or persuasive evidence that they produced valuable
information that could not have been obtained by other means"); David Cole & Jules Lobel,
Are We Safer?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2007), available at http://www.latimes.com/la-opcolel8novl8,0,6931314.story (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (noting that the Justice
Department claimed that there were 261 "terrorism and terrorism-related" convictions, but
only two cases "actually involve[ed] attempted terrorist activity.").
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U.S. integrity was undermined with widespread deprivation of human
rights. 9 However, it is also possible that the memoranda were not a
consequential intervening cause that modified Bush Administration
decision-making, but instead human rights abuses may have been the
foreseeable proximate cause of White House assumptions and
solicitations for advice. 1 Consider the following causal flow:

°
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Chart 1 starts with an administration decision and request and
the outcome is torture with immunity. Newsweek referenced an
effective "call for papers" when it reported that President Bush
petitioned White House lawyers to "find a way to exercise the full
panoply of powers granted the president by Congress and the
Constitution: If that meant pushing the boundaries of the law, so be
9. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-28, 875-76; David Abraham, The Bush
Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights,
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 249 (2008) (stating that "the Bush regime is known primarily for
the international mess it has created as the world's only superpower, and for the way is has
sacrificed long-accepted legal norms - military and civilian, international and domestic - in
the name of its so-called War on Terror," which led to "domestic repression" and "the
brutality and denial of legal obligations toward enemy non-Americans.").
10. Judith Resnick, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay
in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REY. 579, 612 (2010) (stating that "[t]he
Torture Memos sanctions actions that, as hundreds of pages of reports from an array of
sources now document, took place.").
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it." 11 Similarly finding specious that objective legal advice instigated
interrogation operations, Human Rights Watch emphasized that "there
is now substantial evidence that civilian leaders requested that
politically appointed government lawyers create legal justifications to
support abusive interrogation techniques, in the face of opposition from
career legal officers." 12 In December 2008, the Senate Armed Service
Committee Report explained that the solicitation "on how to use
aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of
their legality, and authorized their use against detainees." 13 Professor
Jack Goldsmith, who was later appointed to head the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that was writing legal
memoranda, stated that the Bush Administration wanted to "act
aggressively and preemptively," but because officials feared
prosecution, the solution required having lawyers "find some way to
make what [Bush] did legal." 14
Of the thousands of attorneys in the Department of Justice and
American government, the White House repeatedly summoned the same
demimonde of lawyers 15 who referred to themselves as the "War
Council"-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, White House legal
counsel David Addington, Department of Defense General Counsel
William J. Haynes, and OLC Deputy Attorney General John Yoo. 16
11. Evan Thomas, Full Speed Ahead: After 9/ 11, Bush and Cheney Pressed for More
Power-and Got It. Now, Predictably, the Questions Begin. Behind the NSA Spying Furor,
NEWSWEEK
(Jan.
8,
2006,
7:00
PM),
available
at
http ://www.thedai lybeast.com/newsweek/2006/01 /08/full-speed-ahead.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2013).
12.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATM ENT OF DETAINEES 2 (July 2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us071 l webwcover_ 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2013).
13. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF
D ETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xii (2008), available at http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/Publications/EXEC%20S UMMAR Y CONCLUSIONS_For%20Release_ 12%20December%202008.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2013).
14. Dan Eggen & Peter Baker, New Book Details Cheney 's Lawyer 's Efforts to
Expand Executive Power, WASH. POST (Sept.
5,
2007),
available at
http: //www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007 /09/04/AR2007090402292.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
15. Robert C. Power, Lawyers and the War, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 39, 89-90 (2009).
16. Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 389, 389,
392 (2010) (noting that advisory opinions on war-detention, and interrogation were
"hijacked and dictated by a cabal of four highly placed government lawyers."); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 396 (2006) (stating that Bush Administration legal advisors
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The "War Council" produced legal opinions containing highly
unpopular advice and the President classified the memos under national
security so that other government lawyers could not critique the
17
consultation prior to the predetermined action being taken.
Department of Defense
experiences,
From witness
investigations, congressional hearings, correspondence among top
officials, and court records, 18 it is clear that military personnel,
interrogators, and private contractors committed acts amounting to
19
torture or inhuman treatment on detainees for several years with the
20
While top
full cognizance of Bush Administration officials.
21
the
advice,
legal
the
of
some
discarded
policymakers reportedly
damage still resulted in abuses that were condemned by Republicans,
Democrats, 22 the global community, 23 and the Justice Department's
Office of Professional Responsibility. 24
"undermined the ethics of the legal profession and violated the U.S. Constitution and the
laws of the U.S., which they were sworn to uphold.").
17. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN WAR CRIMES IN IRAQ AND BEYOND 68,
77 (Jeremy Brecher, Jill Cutler, Brendan Smith, eds., 2005) (mentioning that an ACLU
FOIA lawsuit uncovered classified legal memoranda indicating that the government
implemented a common plan to execute abhorrent interrogation practices, covered up and
lied about that scheme, isolated the plan from the law and courts, and rationalized how it
was legal) [hereinafter IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY]; See Robert Bejesky, National
Security Information Flow: From Source to Reporter's Privilege, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
399, 420-26 (2012) (discussing leaked documentation that revealed controversies); See e.g.
Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the
Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45, 85 (2009) (noting that the Bush
Administration supposedly changed its opinion to treat al-Qaeda and Taliban members with
some Geneva Convention protections, but this was declassified in January 2005); Michael P.
Scharf, Accountability for the Torture Memo: International Law and the Torture Memos, 42
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 321, 342 (2009).
18. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 104, 107-09, 112-14, 193.
19. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of
Justice, 32 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 2013)[hereinafter "Bejesky, Abu Ghraib
Convictions"]; Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-28, 852.
20. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Op-Ed, There is No Justification for Torture, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 28, 2004, at Al I ("It is . . . clear that U.S. officials knew the law was being violated
[during interrogations] and for months, possibly years, did virtually nothing about it.");
Irene Zubaida Khan, The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Human Rights in the
Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (stating that the Bush
Administration "condoned torture.").
21. 153 CONG. REC. S27303 (Oct. 16, 2007) (reporting that Jack Goldsmith revoked
legal memos, including those pertaining to warrantless surveillance and the Bybee torture
memo); See infra notes 239, 244, 291 and accompanying text for additional ostensible
retractions.
22. U.S. Senate Democrats, Senate Republican Have Been Outspoken Against
Torture-Will Their Votes Match Their Rhetoric?, Feb. 13, 2008, available at
http://democrats.senate.gov/2008/02/13/senate-republicans-have-been-o utspoken-against-
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Principal advisors issued opinions for the White House and
secretary of defense that inverted the law in a broad range of areas,25
ignored legal precedent, misrepresented laws to achieve a preordained
result, 26 craftily carved loopholes on what was meant by torture, opined
torture-will-their-votes-match-their-rhetoric/#.UxoZrT9dWa8 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014);
Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, Senate Supports Interrogation Limits, WASH. POST,
Oct.
6,
2005,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/05/AR2005100502062.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2014)
("Forty-six Republicans joined 43 Democrats and one independent in voting to define and
limit interrogation techniques that U.S. troops may use against terrorism suspects, the latest
sign that alarm over treatment of prisoners in the Middle East and at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, is widespread in both parties.").
23. Michael J. Kelly, Responses to the Ten Questions, 35 WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 5059,
5060 (2009) ("Because of Gitmo, torture at Abu Ghraib prison, the illegal invasion of Iraq,
and other errors in judgment committed by the Bush administration, America is no longer
regarded as a leader in human rights and an adherent to the rule of law."); UN Demands
Prosecution of Bush-Era CIA Crimes, REUTERS, Mar. 4, 2013, available at
http://rt.com/usa/un-crime-cia-bush-804/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (reporting that "[a]
United Nations investigator has demanded that the U.S. publish classified documents
regarding the CIA's human rights violations under former President George W. Bush, with
hopes that the documents will lead to the prosecution of public officials."); John H.
Cushman Jr., UN. Condemns Harsh Methods in Campaign Against Terror, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct.
28,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/28/politics/28nations.html?_r=O (last visited Mar. 21,
2014) ("The United Nations official charged with monitoring compliance with international
prohibitions against torture has sharply criticized several practices adopted by the Bush
administration in its campaign against terrorism").
24.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT:
INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES
RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S USE OF "ENHANCED INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES" ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 132, 260-61 (2009), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFina1Report090729.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2013); Philippe Sands, Poodles and Bulldogs: The United States, Britain, and the
International Rule of Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1357, 1365 (2009) (criticizing the poor quality of the
memos).
25. Several authors discussed the inversion of the rule of law. JORDAN J. PAUST,
BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON
TERROR 86-100 (2007) (stating that top Bush Administration officials knew they were
engaging in habitual lawbreaking, but they used lawyers to exonerate actions); see generally
STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006); see
also SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB
(2004); see generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND
THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THEW AR ON TERRORISM (2003).
26. Scharf, supra note 16, at 389; Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive
Authorizations Regarding Detainee Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and
Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. Rev. 345, 393 (2007) (stating that
"Yoo and several others in the administration endorsed the theory ... of necessity to violate
international law."). Over one hundred lawyers, five former members of Congress and
twelve former judges, contended that the legal advisors transgressed professional
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that extraordinary defensive measures were imperative for gathering
information from detainees, and contended that the series of four
27
Geneva Conventions that define war crimes and prohibit torture were
28
inapplicable or unavailing. Other scholars went further and called the
29
opm1ons "embarrassing," "utterly unjustifiable" legal analyses,
teeming with blatant errors, "not an attempt in good faith to assess the
law," 30 "flout[ing] constitutional principle by establishing law-free
zones and constitutional black holes," and offering "duplicitous parsing
of legal obligations. " 31
With the Bush Administration's request for legal memos,
predetermined preference, receipt of opinions from select lawyers, and
classification of advice, perhaps the result of torture can be expected.
The ultimate repercussion of the memoranda was a dissipation of
responsibility that diminished the likelihood that policymakers would
confront punishment for torture even though inconsequential
intervening events do not sunder the chain of causation between an act
and harm to a victim in tort or criminal law. In short, given the
consistent bias on pivotal issues when there were alternative
interpretations of the law, it is not clear that the attorney-advisors were
obligations because the "memoranda ... ignore and misinterpret the U.S. Constitution and
laws, international treaties and rules of international law." Lawyers' Statement on Bush
Administration's Torture Memos addressed to President George W. Bush, Vice President
Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John
at
available
2004),
(Aug.
Congress
of
Members
and
Ashcroft,
http://uclaprofs.com/petitions/040800torturememos.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
27. Hague Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the
Geneva Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter "Geneva I"];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "Geneva Protocol Additional"].
28. See generally infra Part III.
29. Keller, supra note 6, at 551; Power, supra note 15, at 100 ("As I absorbed the
opinions, I concluded that some were deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and
incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities on behalf of the President.").
30. O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5134.
31. Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow "War": FOIA, The Abuses of AntiTerrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1142
(2007); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb
- A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1096-98 (2008) (stating that Bush
Administration assertions contended there was a right to defy Congressional will, laws, and
treaties via expansive interpretation of the Commander in Chief clause); Ralph Wilde, Legal
"Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and
Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 772-76 (2005) (remarking that commentators
called these areas, such as Guantanamo Bay, a place where law does not apply).
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relevant when policymakers ostensibly had the intention to do whatever
they wanted. The article assesses the far from fluky exonerating legal
positions by dividing the advice into core constitutional arguments (Part
II), factual extrapolations for Afghanistan (Part Ill), and the use of
national security secrecy to circumvent more serious condemnation for
several years (Part IV).
II.

DENYING RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Legal advisors opined that there are minimal constitutional
restrictions on executive war powers authority, by espousing a
capacious and unreviewable political question doctrine, abjuring
applicability of substantive international law, assuming carte blanche
for the Commander in Chief authority, and premising that exigency
obviated the need for reasonable adherence to human rights law. If
these foundational constitutional assertions had been convincing,
advisors would have had no rationale for generating fact-specific
opinions, which will be addressed in Parts III and IV. However, there
were prima facie weaknesses in the constitutional advice.
First, the Bush Administration assumed that courts should not
be involved in restricting government actions during the "war on
terror," which invariably would abnegate detainees from attaining
remedial relief for torture or receiving a review for the justification for
imprisonment via habeas corpus challenges. 32 Pursuant to Marbury v.
Madison, the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional
interpretation, but will refrain from "questions, in their nature
political."33 Courts are not prohibited from hearing cases with relations
to foreign affairs. 34Additionally, a judiciary that too broadly sidesteps

32. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 841-52; Robert Bejesky, War Powers Pursuant
to False Perceptions and Asymmetric Information in the "Zone of Twilight," 44 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1, 86-87 (2012) [hereinafter "Bejesky, War Powers"] (Yoo contending that the judiciary
does not have a role in war powers cases despite much contrary evidence). Other denials
were aimed at foreign petitioners. Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v.
Dow Chem., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16, 43-44, 48, 81-82 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (court dismissing
Agent Orange case brought by Vietnamese plaintiffs against U.S. corporations because it
would open the federal courthouse to "all of the Nation's past and future enemies," and the
Bush Administration argued that herbicides were not banned, hearing the case would judge
Executive war operations, and the Executive position prevailed over potential customary
international law restrictions).
33. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 177 (1803); Edwin B. Firmage, The War
Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 Cow. L. REV. 65, 68 (1977) (noting that
because there is no political question doctrine in the Constitution, it is a common law
development).
34. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Political Question Doctrine and Corporate Complicity in
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questions with tangential political overtones may forsake constitutional
responsibilities 35 and not serve justice, prevent executive wrongdoing,
uphold the integrity of the American judicial system, fulfill reciprocal
obligations to other states, or support the democratically-derived public
choice of American citizens who heighten human rights. Indeed, the
Supreme Court disagreed with legal advisors on habeas corpus
challenges at Guantanamo Bay in a succession of cases-Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v.
Bush. 36
Second, legal advisors attenuated the binding nature of U.S.
obligations owed to other states under treaties and customary
international law. 37 Obscuring what were personal inclinations of
appointed agents as institutional dissension, John Yoo stated: "The State
Department and OLC often disagreed about international law. State
believed that international law had a binding effect on the President,
38
indeed on the United States, both internationally and domestically."
Regarding the interpretation of treaties, Attorney General John
Ashcroft, the Bush Administration's first attorney general, wrote that
the President's "determination against treaty applicability would
provide the highest assurance" that courts would not entertain charges
against American agents for violating "Geneva Convention rules
relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of
detainees. " 39
Extraordinary Rendition, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 311, 332 (2007). But see Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 ( 1997) (holding that Congress persons can lack standing
without a cognizable injury from the President's acts).
35. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 535-37 (1966).
36. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 88.
37. Tel-Oren v. Lybian Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing J.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 287 (6th ed. 1963)) (stating that the law of nations has been
defined as "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states
and in their relations with one another").
38. JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 33 (Atl. Monthly Press) (2006); David Scheffer, Tenth Annual Grotius Lecture
Series: For Love of Country and International Criminal Law, Further Reflections, 24 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 665, 667-68 (2009) (stating that none of the principal legal advisors had a
distinguished background in international law); Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the
Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 305, 307-08 (2006) (critiquing
Posner and Goldsmith and their realist book) ("[N]ormative claims, if valid, would lend
support to the view that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take a purely
instrumental stance toward international law, and that its citizens do not have a moral
obligation to try to prevent their government from doing so.")
39. Document - USA: Torture, War Crimes, Accountability: Visit to Switzerland of
Former US President George W. Bush and Swiss Obligations Under International Law:
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Ashcroft's point does not clearly jibe with Supreme Court
precedent that affirms the President's war powers are circumscribed by
Congress, jurisprudence that affirms the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter
of the Constitution, 40 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention which makes
treaties binding on states and required to "be performed by them in
good faith," 41 or the U.S. Supremacy Clause which states that "all
Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land. " 42 An executive act, legislation, or court
judgment can prevail over an inconsistent international law provision
due to the last-in-time rule, 43 but transgressing treaty obligations may
still be an international law violation vis-a-vis other countries. 44 There
is also no evidence that Congress sanctioned the Bush Administration
for violating the Geneva Conventions or authorizing interrogation
techniques amounting to torture pursuant to the Joint Resolution for the
Use of Force, the Patriot Act, 45 or other executive war powers
authority. 46
A constitutional basis for discretionarily abrogating
international law obligations is sorely lacking when government action
eventuates into probable violations of }us cogens norms, universal
jurisdiction crimes, and federal statutes prohibiting torture. 47 From this
Amnesty International 's Memorandum to the Swiss Authorities, AMNESTY INT'L, available
http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/009/201 l/en/e82562ec-75c9-4092-9a3aat
d2d51484e67d/amr51009201 len.html (citing position of Ashcroft on Feb. 1, 2002) (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
40. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 10, 64, 86-87.
41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI,§ 2.
43. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111(4) (1987); Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
45. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 134 (2004).
46. Robert Bejesky, Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions As the
Achilles' Heel of War Powers, 32 Miss. C. L. REV. 9, 19 (2013) (noting that Congress
defines the scope of the president's war powers).
47. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."); O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5128 (noting that "[n]o
government official has 'authority' to violate international law - no government official
should wish to do so."); Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
175, 186 (2006) (noting that the advisor's contention that the President's decision
"concerning the detention of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners constitutes a 'controlling
Executive act' that is completely at odds with relevant Supreme Court precedents."); Id. at
179 (espousing that the legal advisors "twisted, in small and large ways, international
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48
vista and the fact that the U.S. law absolutely criminalizes torture, one
should not need to rehash the obvious, but Congress did pass a ban on
torture in December 2005 by a vote of 90-to-9. However a few days
later, Bush inserted a signing statement indicating that he would
interpret the law "in a manner consistent with the constitutional
49
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch."
Signing such statements are potentially unconstitutional and the use of
"unitary" in this context is a solecism, 50 but the practical impact was
that the President was evidently still endeavoring to unilaterally define
the fact-intensive conditions for detention and interrogation and thereby
returning to the tantamount supposition that the Executive was not
subject to constitutional constraints.
OLC advisors also denied the applicability of customary
international law when it wrote "customary international law, as a
matter of domestic law, does not bind the President, or restrict the
actions of the U.S. military, because it does not constitute either federal
law made in pursuance of the Constitution or a treaty recognized under

law.").
48. United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 5 CAT/C/28/Add.5, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (Feb. 9, 2000),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100296.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2013) ("No official of the government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is
authorized to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official
condone or tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional circumstances may be invoked as a
justification for torture."); Harold Hongju Koh, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb./Mar. 2008),
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0801.koh.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013) (Harold Hongju Koh, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights,
and labor, testifying to a U.N. committee in 2000) ("In every instance, torture is a criminal
offense. No official of the government ... is authorized to commit or instruct anyone else
to commit torture.").
49. George W. Bush, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and the Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013); ALFRED M. McCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 217 (2006); Eric
Schmitt, Editorial, House Delays Vote on U. S. Treatment of Terrorism Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A25 (reporting that the White House and the CIA lobbied to exempt
the CIA from the restrictions).
50. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 90-92; Jennifer Van Bergen, The Unitary
Executive: Is the Doctrine Behind the Bush Presidency Consistent with a Democratic State?
at
available
2006),
9,
(Jan.
FINDLAW
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060109_bergen.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2013) (noting that Bush issued 435 signing statements in his first term and used the term
"unitary" in the statements 95 times, but signing statements could be unconstitutional under
Chadha and Bowsher).
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the Supremacy Clause."51 Alternatively, the Restatement (Third) of
U.S. Foreign Relations Law states "Customary law that has developed
since the United States became a state is incorporated into United States
law as of the time it matures into international law."52 Scholars concur
that torture is universally proscribed and that every state is bound to
ensure that no one is subjected to torture as a }us cogens norm and
customary international law. 53
Third, legal advisors expressed that the President, as
Commander in Chief, is not bound by law prohibiting torture when
acting to provide national security and that "any effort by Congress to
regulate the interrogation of battlefield combatants would violate the
Constitution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the
President. " 54 If this position is accurate, international law that forbids

51. Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzalez, Gen. Counsel to
the President & William J. Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense,
Memorandum Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees 2
(Jan. 22, 2002), available at www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf
(last visited Nov. 18, 2013). Courts decide cases based on "the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States [but do] not ... conform the law of the land to norms of
customary international law." United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Yoo wrote that no one previously thought to argue that the President has disregarded
customary international law. However, there is actually a substantial literature delving into
the issue. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1226-30 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 815, 844-46 (1997); Jordan J. Paust, The President ls Bound by International Law,
81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987); Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 930 (1986); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: ls Violation of
Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321
(1985).
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, at chap. 2, Introductory Note; Louis B. Sohn, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS 17, 26 (1967)
(noting that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which has been called "a part of
the common law of the world community," together with the Charter of the United Nations,
has achieved the character of the world law superior to all other international instruments
and to domestic laws.").
53. See Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-35; Paust, supra note 26, at 418 (stating
that "[t]he claim that the President has authority to violate international laws of war, human
rights law, and domestic legislation is patently unconstitutional and unacceptable.");
Alvarez, supra note 47, at 186 (calling the torture memoranda "shoddy and incomplete" on
the question of treaties and a "cavalier" and "reckless" treatment of custom).
54. Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 34-35, 39 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/wpsrv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) ("In
light of the President's complete authority over the conduct of war ... the prohibition
against torture ... must be construed as not applying to interrogation undertaken pursuant to
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torture may be facially or upon application unconstitutional any time the
President issues authorizations to conduct alleged terrorism- or
55
combatant-related interrogations that eventuate into detainee abuse.
Moreover, the Justice Department could not prosecute interrogators for
violating the law if interrogators perpetrated torture pursuant to
directives issued under the Commander-in-Chief authority. 56 This
advice is peculiar when official government investigations revealed, and
media reports frequently surfaced with interrogators and military
personnel being accused of significant harm and Bush affirmed that he

his Commander in Chief authority."). Similarly, in a March 2003 memo, Pentagon General
Counsel William Haynes concurred and claimed that "in order to respect the President's
inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign," the prohibition against
torture "must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his
Commander-in-Chief authority." Ingrid Arnesen, Detainees Not Covered by Geneva
at
available
2004),
9,
(June
CNN
Concluded,
Report
Conventions,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/09/detention.report/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2013); see
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009)
(critiquing Posner and Goldsmith's realist-oriented book and stating that "[a] policy-maker
reading the book might well conclude that compliance with international law, such as the
1949 Geneva Conventions or the Convention against torture, is optional.").
55. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31 ("Even if an interrogation method arguably were to
violate Section 2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached
on the President's constitutional power to conduct a military campaign."); Dana Priest & R.
Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST (June 8, 2004),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7 .html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2013) (noting that the legal advisors asserted that "international laws
against torture 'may be unconstitutional if applied to interrogations' conducted in President
Bush's war on terrorism.").
56. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at xviii, xxi-xxii (stating that
CIA and military officials were concerned about the legality of the methods, but Yoo
advised that subordinates could not be prosecuted); Bybee, supra note 54, at 35, 31-39
(contending that U.S. officials carrying out orders could not be held responsible because
they "would be aiding the President in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities.").
Yoo contended that "Congress doesn't have the power to 'tie the President's hands in regard
to torture as an interrogation technique'. . . It's the core of the Commander-in-Chief
They can't prevent the President from ordering torture." Jane Mayer,
function.
Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition' Program,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 114; IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at
89-90 (stating that Haynes's memo asserted that the President could authorize any physical
and psychological techniques to obtain "intelligence" to protect Americans, and that a
presidential directive pursuant to wartime powers could be used by interrogators who torture
suspects to avoid liability); Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to
Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the
Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 , 623 (2005)
(stating that the Yoo/Delahunty Memorandum apply an eccentric "theory of ratification"
that contends that the President has implied constitutional powers to issue orders to make
actions of his subordinates inherently legal).
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"never ordered torture" 57 and mandated that interrogators "stay within
U.S. law." 58
If the advice contending that war crime prohibitions did not
restrict either the Commander-in-Chief authority or derivative acts
committed by subordinates had been sound, the President would not
need to refute anything, or direct subordinates to remain within U.S.
law, because Presidential directives and subsequent subordinate acts
were above criminal laws restricting torture. Additionally, it is puzzling
that states contemplated, negotiated, and ratified treaties applicable to
war and armed combat with provisions that explicitly prohibited
interrogation and accepted conventions proscribing torture under all
circumstances, but these obligations were now inapplicable to the U.S.
President59 when acting as "Commander in Chief," which is activated
by Congress and foremost germane to directing U.S. troops into armed
combat.
Fourth, one of Bybee' s memoranda to Gonzales and Haynes
also maintained that the Commander in Chief authority prevails over
international and domestic law because self-defense and necessity can
permit suspending legal obligations (such as the Geneva
Conventions),60 allow harsh interrogations, and absolve interrogators
from criminal liability. 61 If the reasonableness of necessity and selfdefense are systematized as philosophical lenses of the world, such as
with realist views of Thomas Hobbes who emphasized self-preservation
at one pole and liberalist views of Immanuel Kant who emphasized the
importance of human dignity at the other pole, Bush nestled closely to

57. Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Memo on Interrogation Tactics is Disavowed,
WASH. POST (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A60719-2004Jun22.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
58. President Bush Holds Press Conference Following the G8 Summit, WHITE HOUSE
(June
10,
2004),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040610-36.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2013).
59. See generally STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY 6 (1999) (stating that "[s]tronger
states can pick and choose among different rules selecting the one that best suits their
instrumental objectives," which may only require rationalizations to justify the action
predominantly for the domestic audience).
60. Bybee, supra note 51, at 10-15, 27-29; Paust, supra note 26, at 356 (quoting John
Yoo: "It seems to me that if something is necessary for self-defense, it's permissible to
deviate from the principles of Geneva [including the prohibition of torture].").
61. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31-40; W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 84 (2005) (stating that if such
notions are relayed down the chain of command, loose talk regarding necessity and selfdefense might persuade interrogators to conceive that their operations were justified).
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Hobbesian notions of self-preservation62 and therein impaired the
opposing Kantian position as those of critics who were "soft on
terrorism" and who unreasonably desired to limit presidential
authority. 63 There are several weaknesses in this position.
First, as the opening chart imparted, the driving perception of
peril cast by the government into societal discourse may not be a
rational and sober portrayal. Second, even with a gap between
perception and reality, the President's core preclusive constitutional
authority to suspend certain laws and take preemptive action refers to
responding to an exigent and substantiated jeopardy that imperils the
nation. 64 The Bush Administration issued annual and ongoing public
emergency inside the U.S. for several years, 65 which was ostensibly
specious when the country continued to function as usual. The post9/ 11 world is not the American Civil War, 66 which enveloped two
62. Samuel Vincent Jones, The Ethics of Letting Civilians Die in Afghanistan: The
False Dichotomy Between Hobbesian and Kantian Rescue Paradigms, 59 DEPAUL L. Rev.
899, 905, 907-08, 911-12 (2010); Robert Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L.
REV. 29, 44-47 (2011) (discussing the division between risk-averse realist and cooperative
liberalist positions). Rumsfeld justified severe interrogation techniques by calling them
"hardened criminals willing to kill themselves and others for their cause," and Cheney
called captives "the worst of a very bad lot. They are very dangerous." PETER IRONS, WAR
POWERS 248 (2005).
63. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM 213 (2008).
64. President Thomas Jefferson stated that the "law of necessity, of selfpreservation, ... [involves] saving our country when in danger." DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S
CONSTITUTION 193 (2003) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept.
20, 1810), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1231, 1231 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
Secretary of State Daniel Webster explained that to use military force requires "a necessity
of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choices of means, and no moment for
deliberation." R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89
(1938) (expressing that "acts of self-defense must occur only during the last feasible
window of opportunity in the face of an attack that is almost certainly going to occur").
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc.
at
available
1998),
17,
(July
A/CO NF .183/9
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) ("A personal
shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct ... [t]he person
acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person," or engaged in an act of
military necessity required for survival that is proportionate to the danger).
65. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 330-32, 340-41; Bejesky,
Rational Choice Reflection, supra note 3, at 6-14, 21; Av. Secretary of State (No. 1) [2005]
2 A.C. [96]-[97] (British high court deciding that post-9/11 laws to respond to terrorism did
not meet the definition of a public emergency under the ECHR because "[t]he real threat to
the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws
and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.").
66. Eric K. Yamamoto, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the
Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on Their Sixtieth Anniversary: White (House)
Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President Accountable for
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halves of a country seeking domination. Accepting similar conceptions
of danger might permit any country to suggest national peril during
criminal crackdowns and to engage in torture, suspend habeas corpus,
and exonerate the crimes of government officials.
Third, the Bush Administration engaged in a bait-and-switch by
stating that interrogation was necessary to thwart terrorism, but
extended notions of self-defense and necessity inside and outside of war
zones even though international agreements and customary international
law expressly prohibit torture outside war zones, and the Geneva
Conventions additionally prohibit interrogations inside war zones. 67
Fourth, issuing orders for interrogations that approximate torture and
violatejus cogens norms are prohibited under all circumstances. 68
III. APPL YING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO AFGHANISTAN

A. Gainsaying International Law by Factual Application
As depicted in the last part, the claim that the President, under
the Commander in Chief authority or other constitutional powers, can
order subordinates to execute actions that constitute human rights
violations is unpersuasive. 69 Had the constitutional arguments been
compelling, the legal advisors would not technically have needed to
offer fact-specific exemptions for Afghanistan that sought the same
outcome via legal contextualization. However, advisors did offer factintensive positions, including that Afghanistan was a failed state under
Taliban control, combat in Afghanistan was "international in scope" but
that the Geneva Conventions were not binding, the characteristics of
National Security Abuses, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288 (2005) (contending that
"claims of urgent need" are false and are raised to "justify aggressive actions" and
individual threat misrepresentations are only "the tip of proverbial iceberg" of a larger
pattern of misrepresentations.)
67. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36.
68. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 2(2), opened for signature Dec. 10. 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
CAT] ("No exceptional circumstance whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
of torture."). In October 2004, Theo van Boven, UN Special Rappoteur on torture,
responded to the Bush Administration's legal arguments involving "necessity" and "selfdefense" as justifications to attain information, and stated: "The condoning of torture is, per
se, a violation of the prohibition of torture." Many Countries Still Appear Willing to Use
Torture, Warns UN Human Rights Official, UN DAILY NEWS (Oct. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/27102004.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
69. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-35; Harold Hongju Koh, Friedmann Award
Essay: A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 642, 648-49 {2005).
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combatants made them unprotected under the Geneva Conventions,
approved interrogation techniques were not torture, and extraterritorial
jurisdiction did not requisition elevated human right protections. If
claims are sufficiently compelling, or are at least effectively immune
from discredit, the likelihood of imposing liability for human rights
abuses is reduced.

B. Failed State
In January 2002, legal advisors wrote that the Geneva
Convention and the U.S. War Crimes Act did not apply to al-Qaeda or
Taliban captives in Afghanistan because Afghanistan was a "failed
71
state."70 The White House rapidly endorsed the opinion, but the
underlying consultation is bothersome for several reasons.
First, under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, to qualify as a
state there must be a defined territory, a permanent population, and a
72
government in control that can enter into international relations. The
73
question of political recognition is separate from state recognition and
even if a state effectively collapses and the government does not
discharge basic sovereign functions, the international community does
not typically revoke recognition, 74 but recognition can be employed by
stronger states as a political instrument. 75 Likewise, foreign powers
70. Bybee, supra note 51, at 2; Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, to President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020125.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013)
(stating that international conventions did not apply to Afghanistan because the Taliban "did
not exercise full control over the territory or over the people" of Afghanistan, "was not
recognized by the international community," "could not fulfill international obligations,"
and was a militant group rather than a government, which made the Geneva Conventions
"obsolete" and inapplicable in this new type of war); see also S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1378 (2001) (condemning the Taliban's governance over Afghanistan); Lawrence
Azubuike, Status of the Taliban and al-Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J.
INT'L. L. 127, 134 (2003); David Akerson & Natalie Knowlton, President Obama and the
International Criminal Law of Successor Liability, 37 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 615, 633
(2009).
71. Paust, supra note 5, at 831.
72. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
73. Id. art. 3 (stating that the "political existence of the state is independent of
recognition by other states").
74. Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense
Post-9/11, 105 A.J.I.L. 244, 249 (2011).
75. KRASNER, supra note 59, at 15 (noting that weaker states have typically argued that
recognition should be automatic, whereas stronger states have selectively use recognition as
a political instrument); Milena Sterio, A Grotian Movement: Changes in the Legal Theory of
Statehood, 39 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 209, 234-35 (2011) (noting that whether dominant
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cannot violate another state's sovereign rights even if a state lacks
recognition 76 because there are different types of sovereignty that do not
covary; a state can have one form of sovereignty but not another, such
as by retaining international law and W estphalian rights even when it
does not exhibit convincing domestic sovereignty or cogent control. 77 If
the level of violence is an effective indicator, perhaps the Taliban was
the legitimate government in control and did instill meaningful authority
prior to the invasion, whereas Afghanistan slid more into a failed state
status under U.S. occupation because the insurgency and fighting
became more intense over the past eleven-year occupation. 78
Second, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 79 some U.S. allies,
and other countries officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate
government in power, 80 which means that some states did regard the

and regional countries grant statehood is telling).
76. Sterio, supra note 75, at 217-18 (stating that as long as a territory has state
sovereignty it has a sovereignty shield that a non-state does not necessarily possess); Milena
Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans, " Secession, and the Great
Powers' Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 148-49 (2010) (noting that there are some
anomalies where a territory could be treated as a state when it does not possesses the four
elements or a territory not being treated as a state when the four elements exist).
77. KRASNER, supra note 59, at 3-4, 12 ("A state with very limited effective domestic
control could still have complete international legal sovereignty" and be recognized as a
"juridical equal by other states.").
78. Stuart Hendin, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights: The Differing
Decisions of Canadian and UK Courts, 28 WINDSOR REV. L. & Soc. ISSUES 57, 68 (2010)
(pointing out that from 2005 to 2008, Foreign Policy published a list of "failed states" since
2005 and Afghanistan has been on the list); Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistan's
Insurgency, 32 INT'L SEC. 7, 7-8 (2008) (noting that from 2002 to 2006, insurgent-initiated
attacks increased by 400%, and insurgent-initiated attacks increased another 27% in 2007);
Deb Riechmann, Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan Increase, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 27,
2012), available at http://www.newsday.com/news/world/insurgent-attacks-in-afghanistanincrease-1.3865838 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (insurgent attacks spiked in 2010 and
exceeded that violence in 2012). Increased violence followed the invasion and occupation.
As an example of similarly loose treatment in which no attributes of official sovereignty
existed, in mid-December 2012, the U.S. recognized a purported coalition of rebel groups as
the representative of the Syrian people. Jessica Golloher, Russia Slams US over its Syria
Stance, VOA NEWS, (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.voanews.com/content/russiacriticizes-us-for-recognizing-syrian-opposition/1563252.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
The Assad family has ruled the country for decades. Erin McClam, Who are the Assads?
Inside the family that has ruled Syria for decades, NBC NEWS.COM (Aug. 30, 2013)
available at http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/29/20247267-who-are-theassads-inside-the-family-that-has-ruled-syria-for-decades?lite (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
79. Srividhya Ragavan & Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detainees from the
Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 619, 628 (2005).
80. Joshua S. Clover, Comment, "Remember, We 're The Good Guys": The
Classification and Trial of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 359
(2004).
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Taliban as the de Jure government. 81 Afghanistan also remained a
member of international institutions during the 1990s. 82 Denying
recognition to Afghanistan also seems affected and inconsistent with the
facts because both the Clinton and Bush Administrations held
diplomatic relations with the Taliban as they discussed a potential
contract with multinational energy companies for constructing a transConsequently, even without being legallycountry pipeline. 83
recognized or holding membership in organizations, the Taliban was at
least the de facto government of Afghanistan. 84
Third, Afghanistan was a party to the Geneva Conventions, 85
which binds the territory and successive regimes after ratification.
Legal advisers recognized that Afghanistan had been a party to the
Geneva Conventions prior to the Taliban coming to power. 86 The
87
Geneva Conventions apply during all conflicts and to all combatants
and humanitarian law is designed to protect human rights of everyone
during combat and wars, 88 which obviates the logic that inhabitants of a
81. Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 539 n.19, 543-44 (2002). Former State Department
legal advisor William Taft IV wrote, "before, during, and after the emergence of the
Taliban ... Afghanistan constituted a state." Mayer, supra note 56, at 112.
82. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 116 (3d ed. 2010).
83. Robert Bejesky, Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market
Expectations, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 193, 265-71 (2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Geopolitics"];
Azubuike, supra note 70, at 133 (stating that the U.S., through the CIA, reportedly helped
bring the Taliban to power).
84. Annyssa Bella), Gilles Giacca & Stuart Casey-Maslen, International Law and
Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT' L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 25 (Mar. 2011),
available at www .icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-881-maslen.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013) (stating that "the Taliban before and in 2001 ... surely fulfilled the criterion
of de facto authority over a population"); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black
Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 7 (2004) ("Before the armed conflict started, the Taliban
government had been in effective control of Afghanistan."). Examples of de facto states
include Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus, Northern Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Southern Ossetia
and Taiwan. Sterio, supra note 75, at 226.
85. lnt'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Signatories to Protocol Additional to the Geneva
at
available
1949,
August
12
of
Conventions
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Nov. 11, 2013)
(Afghanistan signed in 1949 and became a party in 1956).
86. Bybee, supra note 51, at 10-11, 14-20.
87. Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture Memos addressed to
President George W. Bush, Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Members of Congress, supra note 26 ( over
one hundred legal professionals signing).
88. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1283, OEA/Ser.LN/11.106,
doc.6 rev., at 1291 (1999), available athttp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/us 109-99 .html
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territory cannot derive rights when present in a "failed state."89
Moreover, it is not clear that Geneva requires Afghanistan to be a party
for the rules to be binding because Geneva law is non-derogative and is
not premised on reciprocal compliance, but on obligations owed by and
to all humankind. 90 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
mandates that all detainees "shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely," which is an assurance that is not subject to the Executive
discretion of a participant country. 91
Fourth, as a practical argument, Bush's legal advisers
maintained that a blanket non-suspension approach would be unwise
because "international law would leave an injured party effectively
remediless if its adversaries committed material breaches of the Geneva
Conventions."92 Ergo, irrespective of whether obligations are driven by
universality, American soldiers could not be guaranteed to receive
protected treatment from a foe that is not bound to the Geneva
Conventions when hospitable treatment is normally based on
reciprocity. 93 It is unfortunate that wartime humanitarian abuses can

(last visited Nov. 6, 2013) (Geneva rights should be viewed broadly because "individual
rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity"); Mayer, supra note 56, at 114 (A
former State Department lawyer remarking: "There is no such thing as a non-covered person
under the Geneva Conventions."); Robert A. Peal, Combatant Status Review Tribunals and
the Unique Nature of the War on Terror, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1634 (2005) (noting
distinctions between a war and armed conflict, such as the intensity of the violence, and
capability of the parties to endure sustained fighting).
89. Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the
President (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/taft.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2013) (responding to Yoo's draft and noting that carte blanche denial of POW
status to the Taliban, assuming Afghanistan ceased to be a party to Geneva, that the
president can suspend Geneva's applicability in Afghanistan, and that customary
international law does not bind the U.S., are all wrong).
90. Paust, supra note 5, at 815, 830 (calling the January 9, 2002 memo another
"attempted avoidance of international and domestic criminal responsibility for interrogation
tactics."); Scharf, supra note 17, at 94-95 (former JCS General Richard Myers explaining:
"We train our people to obey the Geneva Conventions, it's not even a matter of whether it is
reciprocated-it's a matter of who we are.").
91. Paust, supra note 26, at 407; Steyn, supra note 84, at 5 (noting that "[w]hatever
their status, such prisoners are entitled to humane treatment"); 3 COMMENTARY ON THE
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 35-37 (Jean S.
Picteted., 1960) (stating that Common Article 3 is "applicable automatically, without any
condition in regard to reciprocity"); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2005)
(referencing that the ICRC also interprets Article 3 expansively and reasoned that "nobody
in enemy hands can be outside the law"); Id. at 2795-96 (holding that Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions applies to all expansive combat between countries and non-state
actors).
92. Bybee, supra note 51, at 24-25.
93. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 43 (reciprocity requirement to provide names of
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occur, and that both sides of a conflict typically commit human rights
abuses to varying degrees, 94 but given that advisory opinions and Bush
Administration statements were issued so early after invasion and
captured detainees were quickly being removed from Afghanistan, one
might even view that the Bush Administration provided the initial
predominant signal to combatants in Afghanistan that the U.S. was not
95
This is a costly
obligated to treat detainees with full protections.
signal for American troops because the Geneva Conventions are the
most reliable framework that would protect Americans if they were
captured in a foreign country,96 and compelling arguments can be made
that the reputational effect for not providing humane treatment is grave.

C. International in Scope
Legal advisors concurred that the bulk of the Geneva
Convention did not apply to protect al-Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan because Common Article 2 applies to "armed conflict
individuals detained); id., art. 132 ( obligation to exchange prisoners to the other side when
hostilities end). Perhaps somewhat baffling with such consternation over reciprocity, is that
the legal advisors initially contended (and the Bush Administration agreed) that the Geneva
Conventions were inapplicable to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which insinuates that the foe
must also not be bound, but Gonzales opined that customary laws of war could still be
utilized to bring war crimes charges against al-Qaeda and the Taliban for combat in
Afghanistan. Bybee, supra note 51, at 2-3, 25 ("Taliban troops ... torture. any American
prisoners ... [t]he U.S. military thus could prosecute Taliban militiamen for war crimes for
engaging in such conduct.").
94. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL 115-19 (2004).
95. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of
Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 711, 758 (2008)
(contending that when the Bush Administration violated International Humanitarian Law, it
"provided an added incentive for non-state actors to take the position that IHL does not
apply to them.").
96. Memorandum from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Alberto Gonzalez, Counsel
at
available
2002),
26,
(Jan.
1
President
the
to
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.26.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) (stating the Geneva Conventions should apply to those captured in Afghanistan and
failure to do so would "reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the
Geneva conventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in
this specific conflict and in general"); Joby Warrick, Administration says Particulars may
Trump Geneva Protections, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2008), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-04-27 /politics/36898081 _ 1_interrogationbenczkowski-letters (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). Senator Graham, who opposed the
administration's detainee policies, remarked that the Geneva Convention "rules we set up
speak more about us than it does the enemy." Kate Zernike, G.O.P. Senator Resisting Bush
at
available
2006),
18,
(July
TIMES
N.Y.
Detainees,
over
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07 /18/washington/18graham.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
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'between two or more of the High Contracting Parties"' and Article 3
did not apply. 97 Common Article 2 refers to conflict with two or more
opposing states engaged in international armed conflict; 98 and Common
Article 3 applies to non-international armed conflict,99 which by process
of elimination, applies to any type of conflict not involving two rival
states, such as combat between government forces and insurgents or
non-governmental forces.
Common Article 3 is consistent with
ensuring that all persons involved in conflict have human rights and are
protected. 100
97. Bybee, supra note 51, at 9 ("[A] non-governmental organization cannot be parties
to any of the international agreements here governing the laws of war. .. al-Qaeda is not a
High Contracting Party. As a result, the U.S. military's treatment of al-Qaeda members is
not governed by the bulk of the Geneva Conventions, specifically those provisions
concerning POWs."); see also id. at 9-10 (al-Qaeda is a "non-governmental terrorist
organization" and al-Qaeda and the Taliban were criminal organizations, which meant there
were no available protections under the Third Geneva Convention.). Gonzales, Haynes, and
Yoo concurred. Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2004),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/ I 0/24/international/worldspecial2/24gitmo.html ?pagewanted
=all&position= (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (Gonzales called the opinion "definitive.").
Haynes and Yoo contended that "neither the Third nor Fourth Geneva Conventions
protected al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees captured in Afghanistan," and Bybee contended
that "neither the federal War Crimes Act nor the Geneva Conventions would apply to the
detention of al-Qaeda prisoners." Bybee, supra note 51, at 37; Jeremy Waldron, Torture
and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1691
(2005) (noting that Yoo contended that the Geneva Conventions "apply to some captives or
detainees but not to others, and that they do not apply to al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees in
the war on terror."). On April 4, 2003, Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker concurred
that the Taliban was not afforded protection under the Geneva Convention because they are
"unlawful combatants" and that it does not apply to al-Qaeda because al-Qaeda is not a
contracting party. Paust, supra note 5, at 841-42.
98. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
[hereinafter "Geneva II"]. An "armed conflict," whether of an international or noninternational character is "a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
70 (Int') Crim. Trib. for the former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
99. Article Three applies in "cases of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." Geneva I, supra note 27,
art. 3; Geneva II, supra note 98, art. 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter "Geneva Ill"].
100. See Shannon M. Roesler, The Ethics of Global Justice Lawyering, 13 YALE H.R.
& DEV. L.J . 185, 208 (2010) (noting that an egalitarian understanding of the law mandates
that all human beings be regarded with equal worth); see O'Connell, Responses, supra note
5, at 5132 (noting that "all persons caught up in armed conflict have the protections of the
Geneva Conventions - all persons"); see also Jordan Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and
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Citing legal memoranda, Bush announced that he had "the
authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the
United States and Afghanistan," but would not presently do so; that he
accepted legal advice contending that "Article 3 of Geneva does not
apply to either al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other
reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and common
Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflict not of an international
character;"' and that he would still apply provisions of Geneva "to our
present conflict with the Taliban." 101
There is substantial precedent to support the position that
battling terrorism is an international armed conflict requiring Geneva
protections, 102 but it might have even been logical to announce that
American operations in Afghanistan did not involve armed conflict of
Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment,
Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1335, 1351 (2004) (stating that Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions guarantee
minimum protections, including the right to be free from torture, humiliation, and cruel and
unusual treatment, and to be treated humanely, and Article 3 applies to all detainees,
including POWs and unprivileged belligerents).
101. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to Vice President Dick Cheney, et
al. (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/CIA.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2013); Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, WHITE HOUSE, available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13 .html (last
visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate
Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the [Geneva] Convention, and the President
has determined that the Taliban are covered by the Convention.").
102. Comm 'n of Inquiry on Lebanon, Rep. Pursuant to Human Rights Council
55, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2, (Nov. 23, 2006) (finding the fighting
Resolution S-2/1,
between Israel and Hezbollah an international armed conflict, substantially because
Hezbollah was called a "militia belonging to a Party to the conflict."); HCJ 769/02 Public
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, at 43 [2006], available at
that
(holding
http://elyonI.court.gov .il/Files_ ENG/02/690/007 I A34/02007690.a34.pdf
military operations against terrorism involved an "armed conflict of an international
character," requiring application of the Geneva Conventions); contra Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 628-31 (2006) (calling conflict with al-Qaeda a non-international armed
conflict); see also Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in
the War on Terror: Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings Case, 89 INT'L
at
available
(2007),
377-78
373,
CROSS
RED
REV.
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_ 866_ milanovic.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013). Also, if there is a sufficiently substantial connection between a state and a nongovernmental group, then the fighting should be called an international conflict. Sylvain
Vite, Typology ofArmed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and
Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. RED. CROSS 69, 71 (2009), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A Judgment on Appeal,, 92-93 , (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tadaj990715e.pdf (holding that there is an international armed conflict when a non-state group
is in conflict with another state when the non-state group "belongs to" another state).
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an international character, perhaps due to the "failed state" allegation, as
long as one finds that operations involve conflict not of an international
character, 103 which implicitly still means that basal Geneva Convention
rights apply. Ultimately, with Bush offering the indecisive comment of
having authority to "suspend the Geneva Convention" 104 and that
minimal standards of Article 3 did not apply, an impression is
seemingly implanted that nothing is truly binding and that any
protection from that origin of zilch appears gratuitous. Ironically
enough, Bush did not eagerly apply Geneva provisions, 105 but instead
stated several years later that Article 3 applied. 106
The other problem stems from the use of heuristics-the
targeted foe evolved and there was selective use of the phrase "war on
terrorism" to empower the president on the one hand and reduce
international law restrictions on the other. Congress passed the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in September 2001 to
permit the U.S. military to capture Osama bin Laden and those
associated with 9/11, which was then expanded to suspected al-Qaeda
members in Afghanistan, to the Taliban, and to segments of the Afghani
population that opposed the occupation after the U.S. installed a
president and established military bases. 107 The United Nations called
the attack on Afghanistan a "war" between two states, and Bush said the
attack on Afghanistan was part of a "war on terror" apparently harbored
those connected to 9/11. 108 Thus, for purposes of unleashing unbridled
l 03. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14, 64-65, ,, 114-16 (June 27) (holding that the Contras' battle against the
legitimate government of Nicaragua was a non-international armed conflict, but the U.S.
involvement in training, equipping, and financing the Contras did not result in effective
control over the Contras); David Glazier, Playing By the Rules, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV.
957, 994 (2009) (discussing the battle with al-Qaeda and expressing that "[i]f the choice is
between the rules governing 'international' and 'noninternational' conflict, then the former
is clearly the better alternative.").
104. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 101 (Bush remarking: "Although we never recognized
the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the [Geneva]
Convention, and the President has determined that the Taliban are covered by the
Convention.").
105. William H. Taft, The Geneva Conventions and the Rules of War in the Post-9/11
and Iraq World, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 149, 154-55 (2005) (noting that Bush did not
implement the provisions).
106. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007) ("Common Article
3 shall apply to a program of detention and interrogation operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency.")
107. Bejesky, Geopolitics, supra note 83, at 273.
108. Bush Gives Update on War Against Terrorism, CNN (Oct. 11, 2001), available at
http://articles.cnn.com/200 l-10-11 /us/gen.bush.transcript_ 1 terror-islamic-nationswar?_ s=PM: US ("[W]ar against all those who seek to export terror and a war against those
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moral and legal authority or power and deploying sophisticated
weaponry and aircraft and the U.S. military under the Commander-in109
which
Chief authority to combat a formidable army, it is a war,
suggests there is an international armed conflict and Article Two should
have applied inside Afghanistan.
The inconsistency arises when al-Qaeda as the enemy is
emphasized to call it a "global" war, but under international law, a state
cannot be at war with belligerents, insurgents, or non-state actors, such
as Osama bin Laden. Only Congress can declare war and it technically
never authorized any broadly construed "war on terror," 110 but Bush
interpreted the AUMF to assume expansive Commander-in-Chief
111
authority for war against "every terrorist group of global reach."
However, because war is a conflict involving at least two opposing
states, 112 perhaps commentators are correct that "the war on terror" was

governments that support or shelter them."); Ragavan & Mireles, supra note 79, at 629-30;
Johannes van Aggelen, The Bush Administration 's War on Terror: The Consequences of
Unlawful Preemption and the Legal Duty to Protect the Human Rights of Victims, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 30 (2009) ("Neither of the Security Council resolutions nor NATO's
September 12, 2001 statement attempted to establish a link between terrorist acts and a
particular state.") NATO members deployed troops. Kenneth Anderson, United Nations

Collective Security and the United States Security Guarantee in an Age of Rising
Multipolarity: The Security Council as the Talking Shop of the Nations, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L.
55, 68 (2009) ("[NATO] went along to support an ally in a general sense, [but] not because
they believed this mission was actually core to the NA TO mutual security pact.").
109. Stephen P. Marks, Branding the "War on Terrorism": Is There a "New
Paradigm" of International Law? 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 71, 88-89 (2005).
110. Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking al-Qaeda and Iraq, 56 How.
L.J. 1, 8-11 (2012) [hereinafter "Bejesky, CFP"]; Paust, supra note 26, at 346; see contra
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2056-57 (2005) (disagreeing with those contending
that "powers being granted to the President are limited or truncated in some fashion because
Congress has not declared war" and that "the powers granted to the President in the AUMF
are limited or truncated in some fashion because conflict with terrorists is not a 'real war."').
111. Marks, supra note 109, at 75; Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies
to Combat Al-Qa'eda, the Taliban, and the Associated Forces - The First Year, 30 PACE L.
Rev. 340, 344-45 (2010) (stating that the "War on Terror" is "not accurate in what it
purported to describe" and does not list an enemy); Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming
Necessity, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 230 (2008) ("By invoking a so-called 'war on terrorism,'
government officials seek the availability of exceptional powers to act.").
112. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN
OF INEQUALITY, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 21-22 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett
Publ'g Co. Inc. 1983) (1762) ("War is not therefore a relationship between one man and
another, but relationship between one state and another. In war private individuals are
enemies only incidentally: not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers."); YoRAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 5 (4th ed. 2005) ("In all definitions it is
clearly affirmed that war is a contest between states.").
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only a metaphor 113 that called for improved police work. 114 Whatever
the invasion of Afghanistan should have been called, and whether it was
international or non-international conflict, international law does not
permit denying Geneva Convention protections or grant a right to
engage in interrogation tactics that may be torture. 115 Nonetheless, the
bifurcation of the enemy and select use of rhetoric may also have led to
esoteric assumptions about U.S. military operations in foreign lands and
another legal loophole that rejected occupation and human rights law,
which ordinarily guarantee generally-applicable rights even when the
Geneva Conventions are inapplicable.

D. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) affirms: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." 116 The
Bush Administration reduced the ICCPR's jurisdictional applicability
by omitting the "subject to its jurisdiction" portion of the provision and
contended that U.S. human rights obligations were only available in the
"territory of the United States." 117 Alternatively, Germany, the U.K.,
Australia, and Belgium all executed documents with the UN that
recognized that they accepted jurisdiction over actions of their forces
deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq; 118 U.S. military doctrine requires
human rights treaties to be followed in foreign stability operations; 119
113. Brooks, supra note 6, at 716-17; George Anastaplo, September 11th, A Citizen's
Responses (Continued), 4 LOY. INT'L L. REV. 135, 157 (noting that 9/11 was "a vicious
assault by a gang of international criminals"); Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, "Global War on
Terror" is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2009), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-03-25/politics/36918330_ 1_congressionaltestimony-obama-administration-memo (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
114. Anastaplo, supra note 113, at 154.
115. CAT, supra note 68.
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter "ICCPR"].
117. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Comm.: United States of America,, 130, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005).
118. Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 256 n.124 (2010).
119. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3.07: STABILITY OPERATIONS 1-7 (Oct. 6,
2008), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf (last visited
Nov. 13, 2013); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOTNT PUBLICATION 1, JOINT WARFARE OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, at 11-2 (Jan. 10, 1995), available at
http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/cgi-
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and the Bush Administration's position was inconsistent with existing
120
the Interprecedent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
121
UN Human Rights
American Committee on Human Rights,
Committee, 122 and the UN General Assembly, 123 which have affirmed
that human rights treaties apply beyond a state's territory.
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) precedent is not
binding on the U.S., but interpretations provide insight and persuasive
bin/virtcdlib/index.cgi/4240529/FID6/pdfdocs/jel/new_pubs/jp 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) ( "[Military officials and troops] respect human rights. We observe the Geneva
Conventions not only as a matter of legality but from conscience.").
120. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136,, 109 (July 9) (holding that the jurisdiction of
states "may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory," particularly when there
is a "constant practice" of exercising control over that territory); Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 39
(June 21) ("[T]he fact that South Africa no longer has any title to administer the Territory
does not release it from its obligations and responsibilities under international law"). The
Wall advisory opinion states that the Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights,
the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, all
apply extra-territorially when a state exercises effective control over a foreign territory.
Tom Dannenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective
Accountability: How Liability Should be Apportioned for Violations of Human Rights by
Member State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers, 51 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 113, 130 (2010); Cleveland, supra note 118, at 259-60 (noting that the ICJ has held that
either territorial control or "effective control" implicates international legal obligations).
121. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba), Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. (Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 532, 533-34
(2002). (determining that detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were held under the "authority
and control" of the U.S. military, making human rights treaties applicable); Alejandre v.
Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Com'n H.R., Report No. 86/99, OEA/Ser.L.N/Il.106, doc. 3
rev. P 25 (1999).
122. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th Sess., May 26,
2004, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, at,, 2, 9-10 (March 29, 2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/478b26ae2.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (ICCPR
jurisdiction applies, based on reciprocal obligations, to states for "all persons who may be
within their territory" and "to all persons subject to their jurisdiction" when the party has
"effective control" over the territory); Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No.
12.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1984) (holding that "it would be
52/1979, at 88,
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant [ICCPR] as
to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another
State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory."); ICCPR, supra note
116, art. 2(1) (stating that the agreement applies "to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction").
123. Patrick Walsh, Fighting for Human Rights: The Applicability of Human Rights
Treaties to United States' Military Operations, 28 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 45, 53-54 (2009);
Heidi Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights In the JCRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 268 (2006).
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precedent to the jurisdictional applicability of human rights via
"effective control." 124 Article 1 of the ECHR employs language
guaranteeing that all persons shall have secure rights and freedoms
"within [the] jurisdiction" of the parties. 125 Consequently, the ECHR
grants protection "to everyone within their jurisdiction," 126 which
includes extending obligations on a member state when there is
effective control outside national territory, including for what follows
after lawful or unlawful military action. 127
The ECHR addressed case specific facts involving the
occupation of Iraq and extended ECHR obligations to member states
due to effective control. 128 With respect to the U.S., the Security
Council authorized occupation, 129 which inherently affirms effective
control, including after a new Iraqi government was installed, because
"territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army." 130 Scholars may disagree over the point
at which "war" in Afghanistan turned to occupation.

124. Cleveland, supra note 118, at 261-66 (emphasizing that effective jurisdiction is
consistent with other ECJ cases and that "effective control" is not limited to a state's
sovereign territory).
125. Convention for the Protection Of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
I, Sept. 3 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
126. Id.
127. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-Xll Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 354-55 (holding that
extraterritorial jurisdiction is particularly appropriate when acts of state "produced effects or
were performed outside their own territory, where as a consequence of military action
(lawful or unlawful) the state exercised effective control of an area outside its national
territory, whether it was exercised directly, through the respondent state's armed forces, or
through a subordinate local administration"); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7, 2122, 24-25 (ser. A) ( 1995) (holding that that Turkey was in effective control over Cyprus
because it possessed authority to implement and enforce policies with a military presence of
30,000 troops, and was liable for upholding human rights in Northern Cyprus).
128. AI-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C. (H.L.) [153]
(case involving British soldiers apparently killing six Iraqi citizens in Iraq (one was
reportedly in a British detention facility)); Dan E. Stigall, Counterinsurgency and Trends in
the Law of International Armed Conflict, 30 PA. J. INT'L L. 1367, 1373-75 (2009)
(describing how the Al-Skeini case history depicts some unwillingness within British
institutions to accept jurisdiction over British acts in Iraq); Abbasi v. Sec'y of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [64], [66], available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/1598.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013)
(holding that U.S. detentions of noncitizens, who are "subject to indefinite detention in
territory over which the U.S. has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the
legitimacy of his detention before any court of tribunal," were arbitrary and "in apparent
contravention of fundamental principles").
129. S.C. RES. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003)(recognizing obligations
of the legal status of occupation).
130. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 42, Oct.

Published by SURFACE, 2013

29

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 3

30

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 41: 1

Despite all the precedent relating to jurisdictional applicability
of the ICCPR, it may still be reasonable to interpret from the negotiating
history and objections that the ICCPR was not always intended to apply
beyond a state's sovereign territory for military operations, but this is
because international humanitarian law is required to be followed
during combat. 131 The problem is rather obvious because the last part
addressed how the Bush Administration used fuzzy reasoning with
Article 2 and Article 3 of the Geneva Convention to deny full
132
Another method of
applicability of international humanitarian law.
denying international law restrictions is to focus on the characteristics
of the enemy, which could also deny POW status and advance a policy
of removing detainees from Afghanistan and transporting them across
the Atlantic Ocean to Guantanamo; a location with an "ambiguous legal
status" 133 and that may have been partially relevant to the removal of
detainees from Iraq 134 and to abductions and Extraordinary Rendition of
135
suspected terrorists in other parts of the world.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306, 1 Bevans 631.
131. Walsh, supra note 123, at 51-52. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LIST OF ISSUES TO BE
CONSIDERED DURTNG THE EXAMTNATION OF THE SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 32 (Apr. 28, 2006),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68662.pdf (last visited Nov. 18,
2013) (John Bellinger, State Department legal advisor, remarking that "neither the text of
the Convention [Against Torture], its negotiating history, nor the U.S . record of ratification
supports a view that Article 3 of the CAT applies to persons outside the territory of the
United States"). The CAT requires parties to undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined in Article 1. CAT, supra note 68, at art. 2( 1).
132. See Human Rights Council, U.N. Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to
Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism, ,, 99, 101 U.N. Doc.
http://daccess-ddsat
available
2010),
19,
(Feb.
A/HRC/13/42
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/134/99/PDF/G l 013499.pdf?OpenElement (last visited
Nov. 21, 2013) (stating that the Bush Administration decided that human rights law would
not apply in Afghanistan or in detention centers at Guantanamo Bay and other places around
the world).
133. Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional law:
The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 306 (2006); Rasul v. Bush,
124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698-99 (2004) (holding that overseas detainees could attain relief in U.S.
courts for habeas corpus violations, and attain civil damages for international law
It is surprising that the Bush Administration utilized this ambiguous
violations).
jurisdictional status because when the U.S. criminalized torture in 1994 for acts perpetrated
by U.S. citizens outside the U.S., it was understood that the statute did not apply because
Guantanamo Bay was "within the definition of the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the
Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational
Considerations 7-8 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/040403 .pdf. (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
134. Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith to William H. Taft, IV, et al. (Mar. 19, 2004),
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E. Classifying Combatants
1. Legal Advice
Based on advice from appointed lawyers, the Bush
Administration announced that Taliban and al-Qaeda members were not
entitled to POW status under the Geneva Conventions because of their
combatant characteristics, but that they should be treated in a way that is
consistent with the Geneva. 136 Any combatant can be detained to
prevent them "from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms
once again," 137 but whether detainees are classified as POWs, civilian
internees, or "other detainees," can set justifications for long-term
detention, standards of treatment, and the right to prosecute. 138 There is
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/doj_memo03 l 904.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) (stating that
"protected persons," who may or may not be illegal aliens, could be removed from Iraq
"pursuant to local immigration law" for a brief but not indefinite period, so long as
adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated against them"). Alternatively, if a person is
innocent, this could be a form of kidnapping, and if an individual is a combatant and one
acknowledges that detainees are "protected" under the Geneva Conventions, they cannot be
interrogated. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 5-16 (noting the legal
ambiguities that developed over treaty applicability in Iraq).
135. Dana Priest & Dan Eggen, Terror Suspect Alleges Torture, THEW ASH. POST (Jan.
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5 l 7262005Jan5.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013) (Gonzales affirmed the legal authorization for
the U.S. to abduct terror suspects throughout the world without regard to foreign
sovereignty). This can also be viewed as inconsistent with international law. Robert
Bejesky, Sensibly Construing the "More Likely Than Not" Threshold for Extraordinary
Rendition 6-7, 10-12 (Apr. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Bejesky, Sensibly
Construing].
136. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to the Chairman of
the
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff
(Jan.
19,
2002),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc l.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(stating that al-Qaeda and the Taliban "are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949," but that soldiers should "treat them humanely, and to
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, [and] in a manner consistent
with the Geneva Conventions of 1949"); Bush, supra note 101, at ,, 2-3 ("[The U.S.
military] shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva,
[but] the Taliban (and al-Qaeda] detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not
qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva.").
137. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
138. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:
Interrogation, Detention, Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1265 (2005) (noting that these
classifications are also consistent with military doctrine); Int'l Comm. Red Cross,
Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, at art. 46
(1960) (affording protection to civilians and emphasizing that "protected persons" include
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disagreement over whether the correct designations under international
139
meaning that
law should be civilians and privileged combatants,
140
anyone other than a combatant designee is by default a civilian.
Instead, the Bush Administration invented a new category called
"unlawful enemy combatant" to avoid Geneva Convention protections
that prohibit interrogations 141 and criminal prosecutions of captured
combatants. 142
OLC opinions even contended that torture should be narrowly
construed and that prohibitions on interrogation did not apply to "enemy
combatants." 143 Unlawful detentions, prosecutions, or abuse during
144
interrogations mandates liability under the Geneva Convention.
"enemy nationals within the national territory of each of the Parties to the conflict and ...
the whole population of occupied territories").
139. Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in International Law
When the World Changes, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 91, 104 (2009); Manooher Mofidi & Amy E.
Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War:" The Law and Politics of Labels, 36
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 68-70 (2003) (noting that only legitimate combatants are entitled to
POW status).
140. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 50(1 ); Int'l Comm. Red Cross,
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of I 977 to the Geneva Convention of I 949, 611 1
1917 (1987); CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME
OF WAR. GENEVA, 12 AUGUST 1949, COMMENTARY-ART. 4. PART I: GENERAL PROVISIONS,
available at http: //www.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-600007?0penDocument (last visited Mar.
21, 2014) ("Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he
is either a prisoner of war . .. covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the
Fourth Convention, or ... a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is
covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands
can be outside the law.").
141. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 87, 123; JEFFREY T. RICHELSON,
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 307 (2012) (stating that "cheating" is the reason for
Geneva rules that prohibit interrogations because POWs were a prime source of intelligence
about adversaries in wars preceding the Geneva Conventions); George C. Harris, The Rule

of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch
Lawyers in the Wake of 9/1 I, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 409, 432-33 (2005) (noting
that the OLC did not cite precedent for failing to apply any of the Geneva Convention
categories).
142. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 118 (POW s must be repatriated to their respective
countries after hostilities end); Tug Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a

Time: A Non Criminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay
Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 149, 171 (2005). Soldiers are generally not held
liable for following orders, but there can be prosecutions for crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. lnt'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary of the
Third Geneva Convention, 419-22 (1994).
143. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb - Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV .
689, 707 (2008).
144. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 131 (no state "shall be allowed to absolve itself or
any other ... of any liability incurred by itself or by another" for serious breaches of the
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Legal opinions written by Yoo, Delahunty and Gonzales focused much
attention on the possibility of prosecution under the War Crimes Act,
but "[t]heir refutation of its applicability rests solely on the argument
that the Third Geneva Convention does not protect members of the
Taliban or al-Qaeda." 145

2. Distinguishing Combatants
There were two approaches for denying POW status for actions
in Afghanistan based on the characteristics of the enemy. The first
approach included applying Geneva Convention designation elements
and the second approach involved pointedly determining that those
deemed to be members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban were not protected.
First, advisory opinions assume that the Taliban and al-Qaeda
were "unlawful enemy combatants" because they hid among
civilians, 146 which can deny POW status under Article 4(A) of the Third
Geneva Convention because combatants ( 1) are not commanded by
leaders, (2) do not wear recognizable combat insignia, (3) do not openly
carry arms, and (4) do not obey laws of war. 147 The test is intended to
Geneva Convention).
145. Wallach, supra note 56, at 619; Gonzales, supra note 70, at 1-2 (noting that if the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to the Taliban, there was also a reduced likelihood of
criminal prosecution of U.S. soldiers and officials under the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C.
2441 )); Benjamin G. Davis, Rejluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of Criminal Prosecution in
U.S. Domestic Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military Generals for
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 503, 57677 (2008).
146. 151 CONG. REC. 88811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham)
("They do not wear uniforms. They are terrorists. They hide among civilians. They
cheat."); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 28-29 (2004) (stating that combatants who hide among
civilians can lose the privileged status, and a civilian can become a combatant and vice
versa).
147. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 4(A)(l); see Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of
1899, ch. I, art. I, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Conventions on Land Warfare of
1907, ch. I, art. I, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Bush, supra note 101, at 2; Bybee, supra
note 51, at 9-10 (stating that al-Qaeda members "have attacked purely civilians targets of no
military value; they refused to wear uniform or insignia or carry arms openly, but instead
hijacked civilian airliners, took hostages, and killed them; and they themselves do not object
the laws of war"). The problem with this position is that it discusses broad acts of al-Qaeda
outside of Afghanistan and assumes culpability based on a perceived nexus that should have
ultimately been dependent on determinations in military commissions at Guantanamo Bay.
As of February 2013, "there have been six convictions of Guantanamo detainees by military
commissions, four of which were procured by plea agreements." Jennifer K. Elsea, Cong.
Research Serv., R40932, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and Trials in
Federal
Criminal
Court
IO
(2013),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).
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prevent rewarding combatants for hiding among civilians, which can
place the civilians in harms way and provide an unfair military
advantage if the opponent is conscientious in not placing civilians in
danger. 148
On the one hand, the Taliban must have had some degree of
structure and unity in command because it was engaged in fighting with
the Northern Alliance for several years, but members would generally
However, there are alternative
not meet the four elements. 149
interpretations of the Geneva Convention requirements that make
denying POW status controversial.
Article 44 of the Protocol
Additional (adopted in 1977) provides that anyone "who falls in the
power of an adverse party shall be a prisoner of war." 150 The U.S. is not
a party to Protocol I, but 173 countries are members to make Protocol I
an additional source to the Geneva Conventions, 151 which might make
Protocol I's POW principle customary international law. 152
148. Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1025, 1026 (2004); Derek Jinks, The Changing Laws of War: Do We Need a New Legal
Regime After September 11 ?: Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1493, 1495 (2004) (noting that "the question is how best to encourage fighters to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population").
149. United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002); David E.
Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 61, 69 (2005). Some commentators did contend that the Taliban was the armed
forces of Afghanistan, but legal advisers called the Taliban a "loose confederation of militia
groups." Graham, supra at 68. The Taliban lacked an "organized command structure," and
"wore the same clothes they wore to perform other daily functions." Memorandum from
Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/taliban.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2013); 151 CONG. REC. S8811 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Graham) ("We find ourselves in a war with a group of people who are not part of a state or a
nation. They do not wear uniforms. They are terrorists. They hide among civilians. They
cheat."); Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Remarks at
the Chatham House on the Status and Treatment of Taliban and al-Qaeda Detainees (Feb.
20, 2002), available at h ttp://2001-2009 .state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/rm/2002/8491.htm (last
visited Nov. 11, 2013) (identifying the elements for the test in the Geneva Conventions and
agreeing that the Taliban do not meet the test to be granted POW status, but noting that they
do "have the right to be treated humanely"); See contra Glazier, supra note 103, at 1013
(stating that some al-Qaeda units might have qualified as POWs because they did wear the
same camouflage uniforms and openly carried weapons).
150. Int') Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 85.
151. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,
membership,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp viewStates= XPages NORMStatesParti
es&xp treatySelected=4 70 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014 ).
152. GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LA w: CASES AND MATERIALS, app. c, at
585-87 (2005).
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During the negotiations over Protocol I, countries discussed
terms to address liberation movements and to eliminate colonial powers
from their countries and developing countries prevailed in eliminating
the insignia requirement 153 so that hostilities could be conducted from
within civilian populations and belligerents would still have POW
status. 154 Protocol I adds that "armed forces of a Party" comprise "all
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates." 155 If the
Taliban could be granted POW status and there is a sufficient
relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 156 then both groups
could have arguably received POW status.
Article 44(3) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention states that a combatant is not required to wear a uniform
when "owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot
so distinguish himself." 157 The invasion of Afghanistan occurred due to
the acts of 19 hijackers, reportedly because of a plan devised by Osama
bin Laden, who was apparently in Afghanistan. The Taliban did not
direct those who were involved in 9/11 158 and perhaps those wielding
weapons against invading forces acted m self-defense when

153. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(3); see also Geneva I, supra
note 27, art. 4(A)( l ),(2) (POW status is applicable to "members of the armed forces of a
Party" and "organized resistance movements").
154. Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving
Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 683, 724-26 (2009).
155. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 43(1); INTL. COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, supra note 140, 1663, at 508 (non-state entities "may in certain circumstances
become Parties to the conflict").
156. John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 108 (2011) (stating that it
"appears now that either the Taliban could not control al-Qaeda, or that al-Qaeda simply
dictated to the Taliban"); Stephen R. Shalom, Far From Infinite Justice: Just War Theory
and Operation Enduring Freedom, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 623, at 644 (emphasizing
that CIA Director George Tenet considered al-Qaeda and the Taliban inseparable). Not all
agree that there was this tight relationship. Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Unlikely Bedfellows:
Feminist Theory and the War on Terror, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. l (2009)
(reporting that "[l]inks between the Taliban and al-Qaeda go beyond the mere territorial, but
nonetheless are a far cry from the threshold of complete dependence or effective control
applied in the Nicaragua Judgment," which assessed the relationship between the Contras
and the Reagan Administration's covert action team); Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits,
Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and
Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 840 (2005) (noting that the
Taliban did not seem to have any greater connection to al-Qaeda than providing logistical
support).
157. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(3).
158. Reinold, supra note 74, at 245 (noting that "the Afghan Taliban ... neither
directed nor controlled the perpetrators of 9/11 ").
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confronted. 159 There may also be some hypocrisy in not granting POW
status 160 and Afghanistan's poverty may have made procuring uniforms
cost prohibitive. 161
The second general approach for denying POW protections was
to assume that if individuals could be labeled members of the Taliban
162
and or al-Qaeda, they would be designated an "enemy combatant."
"Membership" is the determining variable for an "enemy combatant"
designation, rather than the act perpetrated that preceded capture. Many
authorities disagreed with the use of the "unlawful enemy combatant"
163
label to deny Geneva Convention protections in Afghanistan,
159. Shalom, supra note 156, at 672, 674-75 (mingling with civilians does not absolve
the U.S. of responsibility to avoid harming non-combatants, but early NGO estimates placed
Afghani civilian casualties at several thousand).
160. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 44(4) (stating that even if a
combatant does not meet POW requirements or carry arms openly, the individual will
"nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners
of war"); Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force I Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 878
(2010) (noting that some American government officials disclosed that private military
contractors for some types of operations were advantageous because they do not wear
uniforms). Given that CIA operations are often covert, CIA agents and assets also do not
wear uniforms and may commingle with civilian populations.
161. WORLD BANK, INT'L DEV. Ass'N, OPERATIONAL PoL'Y & COUNTRY SERV. & RES.
MOBILIZATION DEP'T, OPERATIONAL APPROACHES AND FINANCING IN FRAGILE STATES 2
(June 2007) (depicting Afghanistan as the eighth poorest country in the world and the
poorest outside of Africa).
162. Guantanamo Detainee Process, DEP'T OF DEF., at 2 (Oct. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2013)
(stating that for purposes of detention at Guantanamo, an "enemy combatant" is "an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaeda forces, or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This
includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities
in aid of enemy armed forces."); Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of
the Dep't of Def., to Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Dec. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.cfr.org/international-law/enemy-combatants/p5312 (last visited Sept. 24, 2013)
(defining an "enemy combatant" as "an individual who, under the laws and customs of war,
may be detained for the duration of an armed conflict. In the current conflict with al Qaida
and the Taliban, the term includes a member, agent, or associate of al-Qaida or the
Taliban."); see also Memorandum from LTC Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate, to
Commander, Joint Task Force 170, at Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance
Strategies, para. 2 (Oct. 11, 2002), reproduced in THE TORTURE PAPER: THE ROAD TO ABU
GHRAIB 229 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) ("Since the detainees are
not [Enemy Prisoners of War] EPWs, the Geneva Conventions limitations that ordinarily
would govern captured enemy personnel interrogations are not binding on U.S. personnel
conducting detainee interrogations at GTMO."); Ensign Scott L. Glabe, Conflict
Classification and Detainee Treatment in the War Against al Qaeda, 2010 ARMY L. 112,
113-15 (noting that there was difficulty in classifying operations against al-Qaeda under the
Geneva Convention).
163. Paust, supra note 5, at 829 (pointing out that the Bush White House's use of the
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extenuate precedent, confuse the categories, 164 and to use Geneva
Convention definitions not to classify the enemy, but to use
characteristics of the enemy to construct a new category.
"Enemy combatant" was not a commonly-used term prior to
9/11, and there is no reason to believe it was legitimate in this case. 165
In Ex parte Quirin ( 1942), the Supreme Court called six German
saboteurs caught on U.S. shores during World War II unlawful enemy
combatants. 166 The Court pointed out that they were not qualified to be
POWs because they, "during time of war, pass surreptitiously from
enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for
the commission of hostile acts ... " 167 If the intent with using the term
was to assume that those individuals who entered U.S. territory during a
world war with an intention to commit terrorism should be extrapolated
to anyone inside a foreign country that the U.S. invaded, the factual
.
.
.
comparison 1s spurious.
After much debate over the classification of those detained in
Afghanistan, in January 2005, the Bush Administration finally
declassified the legal memo that stated that there was an intention to
treat members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in a manner consistent with
the Geneva Conventions. 168 It is unclear why compliance with
international law should be a classified national secret and it is unclear
whether this intention was in fact fulfilled in the previous years. The
term "unlawful combatant" "demonstrate[d] remarkable ignorance of the nature and reach
of treaties and customary international law ... [because] any member of al-Qaeda who is a
national of a state that has ratified the relevant treaties is protected by them."); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 549 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (disagreeing with classifying the
Taliban as unlawful enemy combatants). The Canadian military commented on treatment of
detainees in Afghanistan: "All the individuals ... captured or detained will be afforded
humane treatment, according to the standards that are applicable to POWs, and that's
according to international law." Hendin, supra note 78, at 61.
164. David Wippman, Comment on Richard Arneson 's Just Warfare Theory and
Noncombatant Immunity, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 702 (2006) (noting that the proper
term should have been "unprivileged belligerent").
165. Peter Jan Honigsberg, Inside Guantanamo, 10 NEV. L.J. 82, 94 (2010).
166. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (noting that they were individuals
associated with a country at war with the U.S. and who would engage in acts that would
support the enemy).
167. Id. at 31, 35 (holding that an unlawful enemy combatant can be a "spy who
secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in a time of war,
seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy ... ").
168. Scharf, International Law in Crisis, supra note 17, at 85; Laura A. Dickinson,
Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law
Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2010) (stating that a new U.S. Army Field Manual
was adopted in 2006 and eliminated classifications between Prisoners of War and enemy
combatants and provided that the Geneva Conventions apply to all detainees).
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definitional maneuvers in Afghanistan were astonishingly parallel to
what transpired in Iraq.
The Bush Administration acknowledged that the Geneva
Conventions clearly applied in Iraq, 169 but for some reason Iraqi
detainees were subjected to the same incarceration and interrogation
policies and many were also called "unlawful combatants." 170 Security
Council Resolution 1483 pertained to the occupation of Iraq and cited
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907 as
applicable during the occupation. 171 The Supreme Court regards the
Hague Conventions, which have been ratified by over 180 countries, as
the paramount authority for assessing proper conduct for the law of
war, 172 and Geneva Convention protections should also apply as a
matter of customary international law. 173 The Bush Administration
simply rejected the Conventions and Security Council Resolution
restrictions in the case of Iraqi detainees. Rumsfeld directed intensive
interrogation procedures to obtain "actionable intelligence" from Iraqi
169. See, e.g., Dep't of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media
Availability
En
route
to
Baghdad
(May
13,
2004),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3010 (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) (Rumsfeld stating that "from the beginning" it has been the U.S. government's
position "with respect to Iraq that the Geneva Conventions apply" and "anyone who is
running around saying that Geneva Convention did not apply in Iraq is either terribly
uninformed or mischievous."). In congressional hearings, Senator Levin stated that
Rumsfeld publicly announced about Iraq on several occasions "that the Geneva Conventions
apply not precisely, that prisoners are treated 'consistent with, but not pursuant to' [the
Geneva Conventions]." Review of Department of Defense Detention and Interrogation
Operations, Hearing on S. 108-868 Before the Comm. on Armed Serv., 108th Cong. (2004),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-l 08shrg96600/html/CHRG108shrg96600.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter "Comm. on Armed Serv."].
170. Comm. on Armed Serv., supra note 169 (Colonel Warren stating that some
detainees at Abu Ghraib were being called "unlawful combatants" and that interrogation
procedures "are not, in and of themselves, in isolation, violations of the Geneva
Conventions," specifically for "security detainees" under the Fourth Convention). Senator
Levin itemized interrogation methods approved by Rumsfeld for "unlawful combatants" in
December 2002, and methods included "nudity, exploiting detainees' fears ... and stress
positions." Id. Additional interrogation methods were authorized on April 16, 2003. Id.
General Miller provided interrogation orders when visiting Iraq; "Policy No. I-Battlefield
Interrogation Team and Facility (BIT/F) Policy" dated 15 July 2003 was produced for Iraq,
and queried General Fay who admitted that these authorizations "contribute[d] to the use at
Abu Ghraib of aggressive interrogation techniques ... " Id.
171. S.C. Res. 1483, 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
172. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 603-04; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
173. Glabe, supra note 162, at 116. Germany did not ratify the 1907 Hague
Convention, but violations were applied as customary international law. International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Judgment and Sentences, Oct. I, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM.
J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947).
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prisoners 174 and originally justified issuing the interrogation directives
as necessary methods to fight the "war on terror" 175 even though
Hussein's regime did not have ties to al-Qaeda. 176
F. Using Interrogators and Classifying Torture

1. International Law Prohibits Interrogation
With legal advice postulating that international law did not
restrict the Bush Administration's directives under the Commander-inChief authority, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply because
Afghanistan was a failed state, that the conflict was international but the
Conventions were not binding and Article 3 was inapplicable, and that
those categorized as "unlawful enemy combatants" could be denied
POW protection, it certainly does appear that appointed legal advisers
strove to meet an ultimate goal of detaining and interrogating prisoners
without legal ramification. These contentions molded the groundwork
for what was explicated more directly by White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales. The existence of "novel factual circumstances" does not

174. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 121; Scott Higham & Joe
Stephens, New Details of Prison Abuse Emerge, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at AOl
(recalling the abuse at Abu Ghraib, stating that interrogations were being used to obtain
intelligence to "thwart the insurgency in Iraq" and "find Saddam Hussein or locate weapons
of mass destruction," and that military intelligence officers were using "MPs to help 'set the
conditions' for interrogation"); R. Jeffrey Smith, Knowledge of Abusive Tactics May Go
Higher, WASH. POST, May 16, 2004, at AOl (stating that there was "heightened pressures in
Washington for more robust intelligence-gathering, because of proliferating attacks on U.S.
forces and the dwindling intelligence on Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons of mass
destruction").
175. IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 94, 122, 126-27; JAMES R.
SCHLESINGER ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
DETENTION
OPERATIONS
63-64
(2004),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2013) (stating that interrogation was being used to gather intelligence and that the "failure to
adapt rapidly to the new requirements of the Global War on Terror resulted in inadequate
resourcing, inexperienced and untrained personnel, and a backlog of detainees destined for
interrogation."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB I (2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa0604.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013)
(stating that "the Bush administration ... required that the United States circumvent
international law . . . " and administration lawyers counseled that "the new war against
terrorism rendered 'obsolete' long-standing legal restrictions on the treatment and
interrogation of detainees.").
176. See generally Bejesky, CFP, supra note 110; Robert Bejesky, Intelligence
Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44 CREIGHTON L. Rev. 811, 858-59, 877
(2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Intelligence Information"].
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177
but
mean that government officials can dismiss existing law,
paradigm"
Gonzales opined that the war on terrorism required a "new
that rendered "obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of
enemy prisoners" because of the need to "quickly obtain information
from captured terrorists and their sponsors. " 178 As a categorical
prohibition without exceptions 179 and with similar restrictions existing
in U.S. military law for 150 years, 180 Article 17 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention provides:

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound
to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army,
regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent
information ...No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them
information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant
181
or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

The Geneva Convention mandates that prisoners of war be
humanely treated at all times and requires states to prohibit actions that
cause death, seriously endanger the health of prisoners, or subject
detainees to acts of violence, reprisals, intimidation, or "any other form

177. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
178. Gonzales, supra note 70, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 175, at 1.
179. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 395.
180. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 34-52, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION,
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34at
available
(1992),
1-8
at
52.pdf#search=%22FM%2034-52%20Field%20Manua1%22 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(stating that "[p]hysical or mental torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the
source's free will ... Torture is defined as the infliction of intense pain to body or mind to
extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure," and "US policy expressly
prohibits acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats,
insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation."); U.S.
WAR DEP'T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
at
available
(1863),
16
ART.
I,
SECTION
FIELD,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/286696dfc21 d967 ec 12563cd00514a91 ?OpenDocument (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that the 1863 Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States (Lieber Code) stated that "[m]ilitary necessity does not admit of crueltythat is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions"); see also David Luban,
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (2005); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1528 (8th ed. 2004) (defining torture as "the infliction of intense pain to
the body or mind to punish, or to extract a confession ... or to obtain sadistic pleasure").
181. Geneva I, supra note 27, at art. 17; Aaron E. Garfield, Note: Bridging a Gap in
Human Rights Law: Prisoner of War Abuse as "War Tort, " 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 725, 748-49
(2006).
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of coercion" to attain information, 182 but these conditions were
systematically violated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. 183
Geneva Convention provisions require prisoners to be given adequate
food and water to maintain good health, sufficient clothing and
footwear, sanitary facilities, and medical attention, 184 but the Bush
Administration overtly violated convention provisions by issuing
directives that upset detainees' psychological and physical conditions,
stripped them naked, and tasked health care professionals to facilitate
interrogations. 185
2. Distinguishing Between Torture and Cruel and Inhuman
Treatment
As for the degree of abuse, trends and policy intentions indicate
that there should be no sharp distinction between torture and cruel and
unusual punishment, 186 but legal advisors issued memos that sustained
the use of harsh interrogations by obfuscating distinctions between
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. 187 These
prohibitions on interrogation are applicable during a period of armed

182. Geneva I, supra note 27, arts. 13, 17.
183. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 17-31, 60-64; Bejesky,
Epiphany Approach, supra note 4, at 6-11, 20-25.
184. Geneva I, supra note 27, arts. 26-30.
185. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 35-36.
186. Koh, supra note 69, at 642 ("Torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
are both illegal and totally abhorrent to our values and constitutional traditions. And no
constitutional authority licenses the President to authorize the torture and cruel treatment of
prisoners, even when he acts as Commander-in-Chief."); ABA Torture Resolution 10-B, at
l
(adopted
Aug.
9,
2004),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/torture/torturepolic
y2004_10B.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (condemning "any use of torture
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon persons within the
custody or under the physical control of the United States government ... and any
endorsement or authorization of such measures by government lawyers."). International law
can be interpreted to absolutely prohibit interrogation and all forms of abuse. Geneva I,
supra note 27, at art. 17 (stating that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of
coercion" can be employed); Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36.
187. See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and
Abroad, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 154 (Sanford Levinson, ed., 2004); Waldron, supra
note 97, at 1727 (the administration was obfuscating "cruel, inhuman and degrading
methods" from "torture for the purpose of paying lip service to prohibitions"); US Experts
Unconvinced by Bush Assurance on Torture, REUTERS (June 25, 2004), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0625-07.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(Republican representative Frank Wolf wrote a letter to the Justice Department noting: "I
am deeply concerned that this memorandum provides legal justification for the US
government to commit cruel, inhumane and degrading acts, including torture.").
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combat, occupation, 188 and as general restrictions that prohibit any
189
substantial level abuse by government agents in other locations.
With several bodies of law applicable in different contexts and
locations to prohibit interrogation that would be torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment, another of the Bush Administration's
approaches was to discount the applicability of generally restrictive
sources by referencing exceptions in one source. For example,
specifically to imprison and interrogate detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
the Administration contended that Articles 1-27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) did not bind U.S.
actions because the ICCPR was not self-executing as domestic law,
could not be enforced in American courts, and that the President could
dismiss restrictions based on exigency. 190
The ICCPR distinguishes between torture and lesser forms of
harm and absolutely prohibits torture, but "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" could be permitted if there is a sufficient

188. Geneva I, supra note 27, art. 3 (grave breaches of the laws of war include
"murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; ... outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; [and] the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment."); Paust, supra note 5, at 835
(noting that during an occupation, the Geneva Convention and human rights law prohibit
torture, "'violence,' threat of violence, 'cruel' treatment, 'physical and moral coercion ... to
obtain information,' 'physical suffering,' 'inhuman' treatment, 'degrading' treatment,
'humiliating' treatment, and 'intimidation' during interrogation").
189. CAT, supra note 68, art. 1 (prohibiting "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person" for reasons of
inflicting severe physical or mental pain or punishment, intimidating, inflicting punishment,
or extracting information); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 6, G.A.
Res. 43/173, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9,
1988) (providing that "no person under any form of detention or imprisonment shall be
subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"); European
Convention, supra note 125, art. 3 (defining torture as "any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him ... , or intimidating or coercing him"); Michael John Garcia, The UN. Convention
Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens
at
available
2004,
11,
Mar.
CONGRESS,
FOR
REPORT
CRS
1,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31351.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting
that "torture is defined as an extreme form of cruel and unusual punishment committed
under the color of law" and that the U.S. enacted statutes to enforce Article 3).
190. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DECADE OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN RIGHTS 45 n.10
http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/2011-12at
available
(2011),
16amr51103201 lenguantanamodecadeofdamage.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
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exigency. 191 The ICCPR is not automatically suspended during a period
of armed combat, such that combat would be deemed an exigency, 192
and Article 9 only permits temporary derogations "to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation" and only when member
Moreover, the ICCPR
states officially request exemptions. 193
Committee defined torture broadly, such as by noting that sleep
deprivation, 194 forcing captives into stress positions, hooding, and
threatening detainees were forms of torture. 195
The Administration was indeed correct when it reminded that at
the time of congressional ratification, the ICCPR was not intended to be
self-executing. 196 However, the Senate made a reservation to the
ICCPR based on prohibiting torture as standards equivalent to cruel,

191. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights, The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 42 REC. OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y. 235, 240 (1987) (explaining that "most of the obligations imposed by the
Convention apply only to acts of torture, as defined in Article 1"); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 190, at 45 n.10 (stating that the advisory memo "entirely
ignored the fact that under the ICCPR, even 'in time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation', there can be no derogation from the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Articles 4 and 7)").
192. van Aggelen, supra note I 08, at 56.
193. ICCPR, supra note 116, at art. 9; Human Rights Comm., CCPR General
Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency, 72nd Sess., Aug. 31,
2001, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.11,
2 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fdlf.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (affirming that
"[ m ]easures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and
temporary nature").
194. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Comm. Against
Torture, Annual Rep., Sept. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/44; GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No.
44, 1257 (Sept. l 0, 1997).
195. Human Rights Comm., 31st Sess., Oct. 26-Nov. 13, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/43/40,
2.2,
4,
10
(Oct.
27,
1987),
available
at
http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/l 987. l 0.27 _Magri_de_Cariboni_v_ Uruguay
.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) (being kept incommunicado for 42 days, "blindfolded with
towelling material," deprived of sleep, beaten, and threatened with torture, was torture);
Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., July 29, 1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, 8.5
(July 29, 1997), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/html/114_colombia053.php (last
visited Oct. 1, 2013) (stating that "being blindfolded and dunked in a canal" and being
threatened with deadly force were torture).
196. U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. 8070 (1992) (specifying that "the
United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not
self-executing"); Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 31 I.L.M. 645, 652, 657
(1992) (stating that "[t]he Administration proposed a declaration stating that Articles l
through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not self executing" and that "[t]he intent is to clarify that the
[ICCPR] will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts").
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unusual, and inhumane treatment as specified in the Fifth, Eight, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, 197 which means that U.S.
jurisprudence and law enforcement practices in the U.S. are applicable
to defining torture and that "the Convention bans conduct that is already
unconstitutional." 198 The White House and Secretary of Defense
directed the use of psychological interrogation tactics that American
officials could not engage in inside the U.S. without violating the Eighth
Amendment and those same standards would be prohibited outside the
United States when the ICCPR or CAT are applicable to American
government actions. 199
3. Endorsing Specific Methods
With respect to the interrogation tactics that the Bush
Administration approved, in October 2002, Joint Task Force 170
furnished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SOUTHCOM with proposals that
were substantially similar to interrogation methodology that the CIA

197. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36, 192 (1990) (the U.S. is bound to prevent '"cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' only insofar as the term ... means the cruel,
unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States"); U.S. DEP'T. OF DEF.,
WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
6
(Apr.
4,
2003),
available
at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2013) (stating that U.S. obligations "under the Torture Convention apply to the interrogation
of unlawful combatant detainees," but only to the extent that "cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment and punishment" was restricted under the U.S. Constitution; ICCPR, supra note
116, art. 7 ("cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" restriction as equated to
cruel and unusual treatment in the Bill of Rights); Garcia, supra note 189, at 2, 4 (stating
that police brutality would not be torture under the CAT, but distinguishing from the lesser
forms of "cruel and unusual punishment" and affirming that both standards are prohibited);
Id. at 6 (stating that there the Senate restricted "mental torture" to mean "severe physical
pain and suffering"); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 626 (3d
ed. 1993) ("The reasons why the United States has maintained its distance from the
international human rights agreements are not obvious ... [T]here is resistance to accepting
international standards, and international scrutiny, on matters that have been for the United
States to decide.").
198. EVIL, LAW AND THE STATE: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE POWER AND VIOLENCE 9
(John T. Parry ed., 2006).
199. Garcia, supra note 189, at 13 (CAT and/or § 2340A restricts torture outside the
U.S. borders). Congress ensured that this was clear with the McCain Amendment which
affirms that the President must "take action to ensure" that "[ n ]o individual in the custody or
under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or
physical location, shall be subject to cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment and
punishment prohibited by the U.S. Constitution." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd(d), 2000dd-0(3)
(2008).
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researched and incorporated into its Kubark Interrogation Manual in
1963. 200 The Task Force proposed three categories of techniques with
progressing intensity. Category I authorized interrogators to stimulate
an uncomfortable environment by yelling and employing deception to
create stress. 201 Category II permitted interrogators to use stress
positions, produce falsified documents, quarantine captives in solitary
confinement for up to thirty days, restrict breathing, induce sensory
deprivation, and invoke phobias. 202
Category III authorized
interrogators to threaten to kill members of a captive's family, expose
inmates to harshly cold temperatures and water, engage in daylong
interrogations, and induce perceptions of drowning or suffocation. 203 In
December 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved Category I and
II, and some methods in Category III. 204
After some officials contended that detainees frequently resisted
approved interrogation methods, in early March 2003, a Defense
Working Group proposed more approaches and Rumsfeld authorized
another dozen interrogation techniques, including implementing
"environmental manipulation," altering sleep rhythms from night to
day, leaving detainees naked in dark isolation for up to thirty days,
applying harsh heat and cold, withholding food, hooding for several
days straight, and forcing detainees into "stress positions" that would
"subject detainees to rising levels of pain." 205 Directives progressed
down the chain of command and interrogators commonly used the
procedures on detainees at all American detention facilities. 206

200. Wallach, supra note 56, at 581.
201. See generally Memorandum from General Counsel of the Department of Defense
William J. Haynes II for Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/additional_detainee_documents/
07-F-2406%20doc%201.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); Memorandum from Joint Task
Force 170 for Commander, U.S. Southern Command (Oct. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013)
[hereinafter Task Force 170].
202. Task Force 170, supra note 201, at 1-2.
203. id. at 2-3.
204. Wallach, supra note 56, at 583, 593-94; Paust, supra note 5, at 840. In November
2002, the Bush Administration approved the use of sensory deprivation, stress positions,
phobias and dogs, psychological trickery, and threat scenarios against the detainee and/or
his family. Haynes, supra note 201.
205. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197, at 2, 63-65, 70.
206. LTG Anthony R. Jones, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and
205th Military intelligence Brigade, FINDLAW.COM 10, 15-16, 25-26 (August 23, 2004),
available at http:/!fl 1. findlaw .com/news. findlaw .corn/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt. pdf (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that on September 14, 2003, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez,
authorized the use of twenty-nine interrogation methods in Iraq, including isolation, stress
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There was emphatic criticism of these methods, which led to
disagreements with international authorities. The Bush Administration
offered retorts with a failure to recognize the degree of abuse. For
example, expressing concerns over the isolation of prisoners, the United
Nations Human Rights Council stated that the "weight of accumulated
evidence to date points to the serious and adverse health effects of
solitary confinement" and that it was a potential breach of the ICC PR. 207
The Bush Administration denied that "prolonged isolation and
indefinite detention ... per se constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment." 208 Yet with the ICCPR's usual applicability
to domestic criminal law standards, there is a general distinction
between placing an already-convicted inmate in solitary confinement
perhaps for a week as a punishment for misbehaving in a penal facility,
and capturing a suspected insurgent or terrorist, blindfolding him, taking
him to an unknown location, and subjecting him to other forms of
sensory deprivation and isolation for weeks or months without being
certain about the detainee' s guilt.
The ECHR deemed methods such as "wall-standing, hooding,
subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and
drink," inhuman treatment that caused "at least intense physical and
mental suffering."209 The methods were explicitly prohibited under the
ECHR, but they were not deemed torture. 210 Legal advisor Jay Bybee
issued a memo that used the ECHR' s case to develop definitions and
approved of methods such as sleep deprivation, white noise, stress
positions, denying food and water, and hooding. 211 However, the
postttons, threats with dogs, and sleep and sensory deprivation, only to revoke the
authorization several weeks later); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites:
Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT' L L. 309, 340
(2006) (stating that an approach implemented at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib was to
use attack dogs to intimidate inmates); Pearlstein, supra note 138, at 1263-65 (Rumsfeld
approved of using attack dogs and other means of generating fears and individual phobias in
November 2002); Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 17-31, 60-64
(discussing abuse at Abu Ghraib); Bejesky, Epiphany Approach, supra note 4, at 6-11 , 2025 (discussing abuse at Gitmo).
207. U.N. Secretary-General, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1177-85, U.N. Doc. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008).
208. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 131, at 107.
209. Paust, supra note 26, at 408-09.
210. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1706; See also International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11 , Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
211. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1705-06; Jackson Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy,
Torturing the Rule of Law: USA and the Post 9-11 Legal World, 21 ST. JOHN ' S J.L. COMM.
689, 721 (2007); Seth F. Kreimer, "Torture Lite," "Full Bodied" Torture, and the
Insulation of Legal Conscience, 1 J. NAT' L SECURITY L. & POL 'y 187, 192 (2005) (noting
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ECHR case involved British interrogators holding Irish detainees for a
few days and subjecting them to psychological interrogation methods, 212
while the Bush Administration's orders routinely subjected hundreds of
detainees to more intense interrogation techniques for many months.
Nonetheless, shades in the degree of abuse may not have been
consequential if the most criticized position of all had been taken
seriously.

4. Nullifying the Relevance ofAuthorized Interrogation Standards
with the Bybee Memo
Perhaps the most condemned memo, 213 approved by Bybee but
reportedly written by John Yoo in August 2002, 214 imparted a legal
defense for government actors carrying out interrogation directives.
The Bybee memo stated that for an interrogator to be held criminally
responsible for abuse, the interrogator must intend that the victim
"experience intense pain and suffering of the kind that is equivalent to
the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe
that death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of
significant bodily function will likely result. " 215 Alternatively, federal

that another advisory position, provided by Judge Advocate L TC Beaver, acknowledged
that the U.S . was restricted from using methods that would be torture or cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, but maintained that approved interrogation techniques did not violate
those restrictions; methods such as sleep deprivation, threatening with dogs, inducing
"misperceptions of asphyxiation," and "mind noninjurious contact" did not violate
international or domestic law); Charles H. Brower II, The Lives of Animals, the Lives of
Prisoners, and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353, 1382
(2004) (interrogators "have used a 110-volt power supply to shock detainees" and
"performed 'numerous' simulated asphyxiations to obtain information").
212. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 405-11.
213. Koh, supra note 69, at 647 ("[I]n my professional opinion, the Bybee Opinion is
perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read."); Waldron, supra note
97, at 1704, 1708 (stating that "[t]he quality of Bybee's legal work here is a disgrace ....
[T]hese are obvious errors, and the Department of Justice - as the executive department
charged with special responsibility for the integrity of the legal system.").
214. Rachael Ward Saltzman, Executive Power and the Office of Legal Counsel, 28
YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 439, 440 (2010) (stating that it was later reported that Yoo wrote this
memo and Bybee approved it); Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on
WASH.
POST
(June
25,
2007),
available
at
Presidential
Power,
http:/!blog. washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/pushing_the_envelope_on_presi/
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (explaining that Yoo kept getting "summoned" to the White House to
tell CIA officers "what the legal limits of interrogation are" and that administration officials
"attributed authorship [of the Bybee memo] to Yoo").
215. Bybee, supra note 54, at 1, 3 (stating that "[w]e conclude by examining possible
defenses that would negate any claim that certain interrogations methods violate the statute"
and enumerating the high-threshold elements to convict).
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jurisdiction was established over torture crimes and Section 18 U.S.C. §
2340A absolutely prohibits physical and psychological torture outside
the U.S. 216 The Torture Statute defines torture as "[a]n act committed
by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering." 217
The Bybee memo's position that such a malicious mens rea is
required for a high-level abuse is particularly surprising when federal
courts have interpreted that specific intent for torture can also exist
when there is an intentional act that leads to "prolonged mental pain or
218
suffering" that is a foreseeable consequence of the deliberate act.
Moreover, the Torture Statute is a generally-applicable law that does not
mention interrogation, but interrogation itself involves a govemmentsanctioned level of dominance by the interrogator over the captive and
the relationship is specifically anticipated to employ specific acts to
inflict harm and make the subject obliging.
With the Bybee memo's excessively high standard for
culpability, a government's logical retort to criticism could be that chain
of command directives could not have authorized illegal orders because
authorized psychological interrogation tactics were limited and
interrogators were not convicted of crimes. 219 After all, the legal advice
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, 2340(1) (2012). There are emerging trends in transnational
plaintiff litigation. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347 (1991); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, 2002 FOR.
AFFAIRS 102 (2000).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) ("[S]evere mental pain or suffering" defined as
"prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from . . . the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; the administration or application,
or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; the threat of imminent death;
or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain
or suffering, or the administration or application or mind-altering substances ... ").
218. Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2004); Zubeda v. Ashcroft,
333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir. 2003); see Garcia, supra note 189, at 2 ("[A]n act that results in
unanticipated and unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture for purposes of the
Convention.").
219. Daniel Levin, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, U.S.
at
available
2004),
30,
(Dec.
JUSTICE
OF
DEP'T
http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Memo
withdrawing the legal advice on liability and noting that discussion on liability was
unnecessary because "[ c]onsideration of the bounds of any such authority would be
inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive that United States personnel not
engage in torture."); John T. Parry, "Just for Fun": Understanding Torture and
Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 253, 267 (2005) ("If the
Torture Convention is the controlling document, then a state that wishes to justify its
violence need only assert that, whatever it may have done, it has not tortured. At this point
the discussion gets bogged down in definitions."); Senate Judiciary Committee Grills
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states that to be illegal, torture must "inflict pain that is difficult to
endure," such as pain similar to "death or organ failure," as
distinguished from cruel and inhuman acts. 220 Most significant to the
approved interrogation methods is that "[ m ]ental torture" must cause
"significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years," 221 which would surely be arduous for a detaineeplaintiff or prosecutor to prove.
With a substantial gap between definitions prohibiting torture
under U.S. and international law and the punishment standards
contained in the Bybee memo, interrogators may have believed that
their own acts would not be criminally culpable irrespective of the
Administration's authorized techniques. 222 The high threshold criterion
might also have been further promoted because the Bybee memo
reiterated that even if there were violations of the U.S. Code, the
Commander in Chief could still use "flexible" means of interrogation to
attain information that would prevent terrorist attacks, pursuant to
"necessity" and "self-defense" justifications. 223
Approved interrogation methods and the President's direction
for interrogation to remain within U.S. law do not explain how so many
captives kept emerging with indications that they were severely beaten
or how as many as two hundred detainees died, with at least 34
confirmed homicides while in U.S. custody between August 2002 and
2006. 224 In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. military doctors signed many
Ashcroft on Justice Dept.
Memo,
PBS (June 8, 2004), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/govemment_programs/jan-june04/torture_ 6-8.html
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (In responding to the scandal following the Abu Ghraib atrocities,
Rumsfeld remarked: "Let me completely reject the notion that anything that this President
has done or the Justice Department has done has directly resulted in the kind of atrocity
which were cited ... There is no Presidential order immunizing torture.").
220. Bybee, supra note 54, at I.
221. Id. at 7.
222. For example, the Bush Administration's interrogation standards did not approve
of organ failure and death as pressure tactics to gain information, but the same agency of
government - the Justice Department - is the same agency that is empowered to decide
whether to criminally prosecute. Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S.
Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, NY TIMES (Oct. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007I I 0/04/washington/04interrogate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
223. Bybee, supra note 54, at 31, 39-45.
224. Command's Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and
Afghanistan,
HUM.
RTS.
FIRST
(Feb.
l,
2006),
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/up loads/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web. pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 390, 398-99, 406 (placing the
death toll caused by interrogation practices at 200 detainees through 2006); Stephen N.
Xenakis, More on: "Doctors Must Be Healers", 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 703, 706 (2007) (at
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detainee death certificates with causes that were tantamount to
226
even though
torture, 225 but interrogators were not being prosecuted
torture and acts of cruel and unusual punishment require punishment
under international law. 227 Is it possible that legal advice regarding the
mens rea of interrogators undermined the reasonable application of
approved interrogation standards and that the legal advice was
incompatible with the definition of a criminally punishable act under
international and domestic law?
Given the definition in U.S. federal law, many scholars and
government and military lawyers expressed that the memo mangled the
228
provided a
definitions of torture and culpability for torture,
"breathtakingly expansive view of presidential powers," was
230
inconsistent withjus cogens norms, 229 and endorsed criminal conduct.

least 98 detainees died in U.S. custody, and Physicians for Human Rights tallied 105 deaths
in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005); James W. Smith III, A Few Good
Scapegoats: The Abu Ghrabi Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military Justice System,
27 WHITTIER L. REv. 671, 675 (2006) (noting that the British also engaged in torture of
detainees that resulted in deaths); Report: 108 Die in U.S. Custody, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16,
2005), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/ l 6/terror/main680658 .shtml
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that based on information supplied by the Army, Navy
and other government agencies, at least 108 detainees died in U.S. custody).
225. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 402-03, 406.
226. Khan, supra note 20, at 8 (stating that despite this evidence of deaths during
interrogation, "not one single CIA personnel has been prosecuted"). By comparison, in the
rare case of prosecution during the Vietnam War, the military court held that "whether
Lieutenant Calley was the most ignorant person in the United States Army in Vietnam or the
most intelligent, he must be presumed to know that he could not kill the people involved
here." U.S. v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 544 (C.M .A. 1973).
227. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36.
228. Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts on
Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407, 1418 (2008).
229. David A. Wallace, Torture v. The Basic Principles of the U.S. Military, J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. (May 2008), available at http://jicj.oxfordjoumals.org/content/6/2/309.full.pdf
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
Federal Courts, The Indefinite Detention of "Enemy Combatants": Balancing Due Process
and National Security in the Context of the War on Terror, RECORD (2004), available at
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/1C_WL06!.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting the "almost
unlimited expansion of executive power" specifically because "the domestic war on terror"
was treated as the same as "'total war' circumstances of World War II and the Civil War");
IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 105 (former Nixon Counsel John Dean
stating that the Bybee "Torture Memo" is "damning evidence suggesting a common plan [or
conspiracy] on the part of the Administration to violate the laws of war"); Jordan J. Paust,
Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2009)
("[M]emoranda ... facilitated the common, unifying plan devised by an inner circle to use
torture."). If Dean is correct, the memo could implicate top officials as conspirators in
deaths and abuse that resulted after the order's issuance date. Id.; United States v. Laster, 42
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Explaining precisely what transpired, Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell
explains that the authors of the memo ignored "the negotiating history
of the treaty" and "went to a completely unrelated document, a health
care statute, found a provision that they liked, and from this statute they
constructed a definition of torture that limited torture to actions
inflicting the pain of 'organ failure or death. "' 231
Even John Yoo conceded that the memorandum does not
represent "majority views among international law academics,"232 but a
former White House lawyer believed the memo's perspective was more
strained than a minority opinion and estimated that "if you line up 1,000
law professors, only six or seven would sign up to [the torture memo's
viewpoint]." 233 In a June 2004 press conference, Gonzales contended
that there were "unnecessary, over-broad discussions in some of these
memos that address abstract legal theories, or discussions subject to
misinterpretation, but [those opinions were] not relied upon by decisionmakers are under review, and may be replaced, if appropriate, with
more concrete guidance." 234 If this is true and the torture memo was a

M.J. 538, 540 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that under military law, circumstantial
evidence can provide the basis to infer that there was an agreement to commit a crime
between two parties).
230. Wallace, supra note 229, at 313 (calling the string of memos "overly legalistic
and patently erroneous attempts to redefine torture"); Peter Brooks, The Plain Meaning of
Torture?,
SLATE
(Feb.
9,
2005),
available
at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/02/the_plain_ meaning
_of_torture.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (calling the opinion "the work of some bizarre
literary deconstructionist"); Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July
15, 2004), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17230 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(stating that the memo is equivalent to "the advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how
to skirt the law and stay out of prison").
231. O'Connell, Responses, supra note 5, at 5136.
232. R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memorandums, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 2004, at A4 (quoting John Yoo).
233. John Hagan, Gabrielle Ferrales & Guillermina Jasso, How Law Rules: Torture,
Terror, and the Normative Judgments of Iraqi Judges, 42 LAW & Soc'y REV. 605, 610
(2008); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture: Prophecy and
Casuistry: Abortion, Torture and Moral Discourse, 51 VILL. L. REV. 499, 530 (2006)
(noting that a percentage of Catholics repudiated Bush for using specious reasons to wage
war against Iraq and that revelations of torture and memos justifying torture called into
question Bush's commitment to human dignity).
234. Press Briefing by White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, et al., WHITE HOUSE
(Sept.
25,
2004),
available
at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2013); Edward Alden, Top Lawyers Call Legal OK for Torture 'Preposterous', FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2004), available at http://archive.truthout.org/article/top-lawyers-call-legal-oktorture-preposterous (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (stating that Yoo referred to the opinion as
"an abstract analysis of the meaning of a treaty and a statute.").
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response to a policymaker request, it makes one wonder how many of
the other advisory memos were intended to be planks of initial
cogitation.
Perhaps it was partially the glut of warnings of abuse 235 and
appalling victim accounts that puzzled Senators when Gonzales testified
before the Senate in January 2005 and when he explained emphatically
that the Bybee memo had been withdrawn and that he and Bush had
both repudiated torture. 236 Senator Kennedy retorted by remarking that
"for a two-year period when it was in effect, you didn't object to it." 237
In fact, it took until June 2005 for the U.S. government to even admit
that prisoners had been subjected to abuse amounting to torture in
Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan. 238 By this point, the Bush
Administration had already renamed the interrogation approaches and
tweaked the standards.
5. Modifying the Bybee Memo and Using "Enhanced
Interrogation "
In December 2004, Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin,
wrote a memo that withdrew the language of the Bybee memo, written
over two years earlier, that required pain equivalent to "organ failure,
impairment of bodily functions, or even death." 239 The new memo
stated that to meet the definition of punishable torture, physical harm
must be severe in "intensity and duration or persistence" and more than
"mild and transitory pain," and that "mental harm must be of some
lasting duration," but the harm need not last for "months or years." 240
235. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 19-22 (explaining that the
Bush Administration had been warned about illegalities in American prison facilities long
before the memo was reportedly rejected).
236. Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2005),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01 /06/politics/06TEXTGONZALES.html?_r=O&pagewanted=all&position= (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Gonzales
stating, after being questioned over whether he agreed with the interpretation of the standard
for torture in the Bybee memo, "I do not [agree with that interpretation]. That does not
represent the position of the executive branch.").
237. Id.
238. US Acknowledges Torture at Guantanamo; in Iraq, Afghanistan
UN, AFX
NEWS
LIMITED
(Sept.
25,
2005),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20060207165 83 6/http://www.forbes.com/work/feeds/afx/2005/0
6/24/afx2110388.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (UN Committee member stating: "They are
no longer trying to duck this and have respected their obligation to inform the UN.").
239. Levin, supra note 219.
240. Id. ( calling the torture memo "abhorrent both to American law and values and to
international norms" and that there may be questions of whether an interrogator
"specifically intended" to engage in an act of torture "in light of the President's directive
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Citing a Supreme Court case to address interrogator culpability, the
revised OLC memo stated that if an interrogator "acted in good faith,
and only after reasonable investigation establishing that his conduct
would not inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, it appears
unlikely that he would have the specific intent necessary of violate
sections 2340-2340A." 241
Professor Jack Goldsmith replaced Bybee as head of the OLC in
2003 and rescinded many of the opinions 242 and called Yoo' s work from
200 I to 2003 "deeply flawed: sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and
incautious in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities on behalf
of the President. " 243 Goldsmith was "anointed as a hero by the media"
for repealing the memos, 244 but Goldsmith had also been known to
represent an ideological position that preferred to treat international law
as discretionary norms, 245 and his 2004 OLC memo added a footnote
stating that "all the interrogation methods that earlier opinions had
found legal were still legal." 246 The footnote arguably nullified the
relevance of the new memo and John Yoo apparently believed that
Goldsmith's withdrawal of the opinion was merely "'for appearances'
sake to divert public criticism in the immediate aftermath of the Abu
Ghraib controversy. 'In the real world of interrogation policy nothing
had changed. "'247

that the United States not engage in torture").
241. Id.
242. Saltzman, supra note 214, at 446.
243. Dan Eggen & Peter Baker, New Book Details Cheney Lawyer's Efforts to Expand
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
5,
2007),
available
at
Executive
Power,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/04/ AR2007090402292.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); JACK
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMfNISTRATION 146-50 (W.W. Norton & Company 2007); Yamamoto, supra note 66, at
318-19 (citing lists of other legal authorities).
244. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349.
245. Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights
Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 421 (2006) (critiquing Posner and Goldsmith's realist
ideological book and stating that "[t]he book cannot be viewed as separate from the authors'
broader normative project - a project that seeks to minimize U.S. participation in U.S.
institutions and to limit the application of the international law," and noting Goldsmith's
realist ideological affinity with other advisors).
246. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349 (citing Yoo, supra note 38, at 183); GOLDSMITH,
supra note 243, at 155-56; Power, supra note 15, at 97-98 (stating that Goldsmith was
entirely supportive of the Bush Administration, but partially cleaned the mess left by
anteceding memos).
247. Scharf, supra note 17, at 349 (citing Yoo, supra note 38, at 183).
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It does appear that nothing had changed. In February 2005,
shortly after Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General and about one
month after Levin's memo was produced, Gonzales endorsed methods
that were reportedly "the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by
the Central Intelligence Agency. " 248 Other than waterboarding, the new
methods that authorized degrees of physical touching could probably
already be presumed to be occurring and many methods were the same
as or substantially similar to the techniques approved in 2002, but they
249
Only the
were now labeled "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques."
25
For
label was changed on methods that were already called torture.
example, JAG attorneys, the international community, and U.S. courts
have called waterboarding torture, 251 but CIA Director Porter Goss

°

248. Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 222; R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen,
Gonzales Helped Set the Course for Detainees, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48446-2005Jan4.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2013) (noting that Gonzales had intricate involvement because he chaired meetings with
top government officials that detailed "how much pain and suffering a US intelligence
officer could inflict on a prisoner without violating" U.S. criminal law and that approved
methods included "'waterboarding,' a tactic intended to make detainees feel as if they are
drowning" and the "threat of live burial").
249. These "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" included grabbing and slapping
prisoners, shaking them to get their attention, imposing long-time standing, placing
detainees in "cold cells," and using "waterboarding." Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA 's
Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2005), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/lnvestigation/story?id=1322866 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013);
See supra Parts IIl(F)(3)(4).
250. Resnick, supra note 10, at 614 ( explaining that "[t]he labels 'enhanced
interrogation,' 'harsh' techniques, and 'coercion' have been offered up in lieu of the words
torture, and the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" to define detainment conditions);
Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 393 (calling the memos "permissible interrogation techniques"
was just "a euphemism for torture"); Manfred Nowak, Moritz Birk & Tiphanie Crittin, The
Obama Administration and Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture, 20
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (2011) (noting that the memos were ostensibly
endeavoring to further justify the system of extraordinary rendition flights and secret CIA
detention facilities).
251. Scott Horton, The JAGs Set the Record Straight, HARPER'S (Nov. 4, 2007),
available at http://harpers.org/archive/2007/11/hbc-90001588 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(noting that JAG attorneys "unanimously and unambiguously agreed that [waterboarding is]
inhumane and illegal and would constitute a violation of international law, to include
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions."); Martin Hodgson, US Censored for
at
available
2008),
6,
(Feb.
GUARDIAN
THE
Waterboarding,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/07/humanrights.usa (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak remarking, "I'm not willing any more
to discuss these questions with the U.S. government, when they say [waterboarding] is
allowed. It's not allowed."). After World War II, the U.S. prosecuted Japanese officials for
using waterboarding and U.S. courts have customarily classified waterboarding as a form of
torture. Power, supra note 15, at 85; Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History
of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 472-99 (2007); Jordan J.
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explained that waterboarding is "an area of what I call professional
interrogation techniques. " 252 Against the order of Congress, the CIA
destroyed the interrogation tapes of detainees who were subject to
waterboarding. 253
Even after all of the criticism and challenges to the standards,
methods approved, and culpability level for interrogation, the President
continued to pronounce discretion under the Commander in Chief
power254 and contended that the CIA had authority to choose
interrogation methods. 255 In summer 2007, the Justice Department
issued "letters," instead of "advisory memos," and noted that the Bush
Administration was retaining flexibility in permitting the CIA' s
"harsher interrogation techniques. " 256 Instead of addressing torture and
Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43
VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1553 (2009) (water-boarding "manifestly and unavoidably
constitute[s] torture").
252. Douglas Jehl, Questions Left by C.I.A. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/world/20detain.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that the CIA subjected Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu
Zubaydah to waterboarding for a combined total of 266 sessions); Dan Eggen, Justice
Official Defends Rough CIA Interrogations: Severe, Lasting Pain is Torture, He Says,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2008, at A3 (reporting that OLC advisor Steven G. Bradbury
explained to a House subcommittee that "if it doesn't involve severe physical pain, and it
doesn't last very long, it may not constitute severe physical suffering" and noting that
waterboarding is not torture). Republican candidate Rudy Giuliani stated that whether
waterboarding is legal "depends on how it's done. It depends on the circumstances. It
depends on who does it." Michael Cooper, In His Words: Giuliani on Torture, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007110/25/in-his-ownwords-giuliani-on-torture/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
253. Scott Shane, Prosecutor to Review Official Handling of C.J.A . Tapes, N. Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.corn/2008/02/10/us/1 Otapes.html?_r=O
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
254. Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 4,
available
at
2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01 /04/bush_could_bypass_new_torture_b
an/?page=full (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (reporting that after Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act (OTA) to prohibit torture of detainees, Bush included a "signing statement,"
asserting that he had the prerogative to bypass the law as commander in chief). The signing
statement should have no legal effect because Congress defines the expanse of the
Commander in Chief authority. Bejesky, War Powers, supra note 32, at 28-33, 89-93.
available
at
255.
Exec.
Order
No.
13440
(July
20,
2007),
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-l 3440.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (reaffirming
that the Geneva Convention did not apply to "al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces"
and that the CIA was authorized to engage in "certain detention and interrogations" that are
not torture or cruel and inhumane treatment, with the "conditions of confinement and
interrogation practices" determined by the CIA).
256. Mark Mazzetti, Letters Give C.I.A. Tactics a Legal Rationale, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/washington/27intel.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013).
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cruel and inhumane treatment, the "letter" distracted attention onto a
new and lesser category of offense by noting that there would be no
violation of the Geneva Convention's prohibitions of "outrages upon
personal dignity" as long as interrogation procedures did not intend to
humiliate, there was a need to defend the U.S., or if the act of
humiliation was not "so deplorable that the reasonable observer would
257
recognize it as something that should be universally condemned. "
In a peculiar interpretation of what transpired, Goldsmith wrote
in his book that the Bush Administration experienced a failed attempt at
presidential expansionism, was "strangled by law," and did not
sufficiently rely on "soft power" persuasion to attain consent for its
policies. 258 The Bush Administration did not appear to be "strangled by
law" to implement interrogation initiatives because as new human rights
abuses were reported, new standards were devised, time passed, and
more loopholes opened based on discretionary circumstances and
actions hidden in national security secrecy.
With respect to laws that prohibit wars of aggression and the use
of rhetoric to persuade, Bush readily issued unsubstantiated terror threat
259
announcements to the American public to drive fear rhetoric and top
Bush Administration officials made at least 935 patently false
statements and hundreds of other misleading statements on 532 different
occasions about weapons of mass destruction and ties to al-Qaeda to
persuade Americans that Iraq was a security threat and needed to be
invaded. 260 Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard Professor Linda
Bilmes estimated that the war in Iraq cost the American public upwards
of $3 trillion when including indirect expenditures, and Bush departed
from office with the lowest recorded American Presidential approval
ratings in history at 22%, which was due to the Iraq war and poor
economic conditions. 261 Not being restrained by law and implementing
persuasive tactics without consequence were substantially due to misuse
of the secrecy prerogatives of the national security apparatus.

257. Id.
258. GOLDSMITH, supra note 243, at 69, 205-16.
259. Bejesky, Rational Choice Reflection, supra note 3, at 37-48; Bejesky, CFP, supra
note 110, at 20-24.
260. Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 343, 348-49 (2012).
261. Robert Bejesky, Political Penumbras of Taxes and War Powers for the 2012
Election, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 1-3 (2012).
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IV. A POLITICIZED ROLE WITH SECRECY

A. The Secrecy Pipeline
As public revelations of human rights abuses and public
excoriation periodically emerged, generally from whistleblower
accounts or investigations, the Bush Administration delayed thorough
investigations by unilaterally choosing to hide legal advice under
national security by designating legal advice, orders for interrogation,
and execution of directives as pieces of encompassing covert
operation; 262 diluted responsibility by timely declassifying memos to
defend that previously issued interrogation directives were legal; and
then modified standards and definitions so they could continue virtually
the same operations. The Geneva Conventions and criminal law
prohibitions against torture and interrogation were unilaterally
dismissed with classified legal advice263 and successions of wrongs
passed without accountability being imposed and with the Bush
Administration only experiencing minimal and temporary political
fallout.
It is true that the lawyers in the Attorney General's Office can
have multiple roles because they must enforce the law and defend the
U.S. government when there is a case or controversy, but the zealous

262. ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL, 24 (News Press, 1st ed.
2006) (stating that the Justice Department memos and Presidential orders authorized
obscene powers to intelligence and military agents to detain and interrogation and that
memos were eventually declassified); Pearlstein, supra note 138, at 1273 (stating that
"Congress was largely absent from engagement in U.S. policies of detention and
interrogation from 2001 through much of 2005 ."); Transcript: Reps. Harman, Hoekstra on
Fox
NEWS
(Dec.
16,
2007),
available
at
'FNS ',
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007 I 12/ 16/transcript-reps-harman-hoekstra-on-fns/
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (Congresswoman Jane Harman noting: "We have a system of checks
and balances and it's broken. We're in Constitutional crisis because of the arrogant view of
some in this administration that they can decide what the policy is, write the legal opinions
to justify that policy and be accountable to no one."). The use of Extraordinary Rendition
provides a good example. Kreimer, supra note 31, at 1189-90; Louis Henkin, A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 231 (1992)
("abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and ...
the territorial integrity of another state"); Lila Rajiva, The CIA 's Rendition Flights to Secret
Prisons: The Torture-Go-Round, COUNTERPUNCH (Dec. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.counterpunch.org/rajiva12052005.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (stating that
there was significant evidence supporting a "long line of renditions without cause/due
process of any kind" and that the Bush Administration was falsely representing that nothing
illegal was occurring).
263. John J. Gibbons, Commentary on the Terror on Trial Symposium, 28 Rev. LITIG.
297, 300-01 (2008).
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advocate 1s not the proper role for legal advisors who provide
consultation for policy development. Recall that the White House
specifically requested advisors to provide ways to "exercise the full
panoply of powers granted the president by Congress and the
Constitution" and stated that he did not care if that meant "pushing the
boundaries of the law." 264 Advisors did push the boundaries of the law
and commentators have called the legal advice despicable,
professionally unethical, 265 in violation of non-derogative international
law, 266 and even criminal. 267 Condemnations followed after policies
were executed due to the use of the national security apparatus.

264. Thomas, supra note 11; Neil M. Peretz, The Limits of Outsourcing: Ethnical
Responsibilities of Federal Government Attorneys Advising Executive Branch Officials, 6
CONN. Pub. INT. L. J. 23, 23-24 (2006) (stating that there is the possibility that legal advisors
could issue opinions to curry favor with bosses).
265. Waldron, supra note 97, at 1687 (emphasizing that it is unfortunate that "views
and proposals like these should be voiced by scholars who have devoted their lives to the
law, to the study of the rule of law, and to the education of future generations of lawyers is a
matter of dishonor for our profession"); Saltzman, supra note 214, at 440-41 (reporting that
after the change in Administration, the Justice Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility and other authorities recommended that the authors of the memos should be
referred to proper disciplinary authorities); Power, supra note 15, at 41 ("Law drove policy
decisions throughout the war, and not always in good or morally justifiable ways.").
266. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 386-92 (discussing how
advisory memos were inconsistent with prohibitions on torture); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured
Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 COLO. L.
REV. 1, 24 (2006) ("The acts endorsed by the torture memoranda violate a jus cogens norm
of international law by advocating and excusing acts of torture."); Waldron, supra note 97,
at 1681 (noting that the torture memoranda subvert the rule of law); Paust, supra note 5, at
861-62 ("As various memoranda, authorizations and actions noted above demonstrate, there
were plans to deny protections under the Geneva Conventions ... The plans to deny
protections ... violate the [Geneva] Conventions, and violations of the Conventions are war
crimes.").
267. Koh, supra note 69, at 654 ("if a client asks a lawyer how to break the law and
escape liability, a good lawyer should not say, 'here's how.' The lawyer's ethical duty is to
say no."); Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 347,
349, 357, 362-63 (2007) ("lawyers are potentially complicit in war crimes when they
'materially contribute' to the commission of crimes like torture," including via the
International Criminal Court or under the Convention Against Torture); Scott Higham, Law
Experts Condemn U.S. Memos on Torture, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4 l l 89-2004Aug4.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2013) (quoting John J. Gibbons, former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals) ("The position taken by the government lawyers [within the Bush Administration]
in these legal memoranda amount to counseling a client as to how to get away with violating
a law.").
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B. Using Secrecy to Hide Illegal Orders
One of the first of the later condemned directives was issued
shortly after 9/11 by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who launched a
"special-access program" to assassinate or capture and interrogate "high
value targets. " 268 International law prohibits assassinations and an
executive order has long banned American government officials from
ordering assassinations, but Bush explained that he was not waiving the
executive order, but instead killing "enemy combatants." 269 The Bush
Administration tasked the CIA with abducting suspected terrorists and
conducting hundreds of covert flights across the world to deliver
prisoners to secret detention centers and other countries with
Extraordinary Rendition. 270 Secret prisons prima facie violate the
Geneva Conventions and International Committee of the Red Cross
inspection requirements, 271 but Bush did not officially acknowledge the
secret detention centers until September 2006. 272 International law
forbids abductions and rendering individuals to countries when it is

268. Seymour M. Hersh, The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came to
THE
NEW
YORKER
(May
24,
2004),
available
at
Abu
Ghraib,
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/24/040524 fa_ fact?currentPage=all (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013); Seymour M. Hersh, Rumsfeld's Dirty War on Terror, GUARDIAN HOUSE
(Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6898.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (describing abductions and noting that they had been occurring
from 2001 to 2004). Secrecy was manifest because the only individuals privy to the
operations were a few top Bush Administration officials and about two hundred Navy
SEALs and Army Delta Force who were to execute operations in elite squads. Noted in
McCOY, supra note 49, at 116-17; Adeno Addis, The "War on Terror" as an Autoimmunity
Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 323, 339 (2007); GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP 88 (Metro.
Books, 2006) (stating that there were reports of the U.S. aiding paramilitary groups
"accused of assassinations and torture" and that a former high-level intelligence agent
explained that locals were being recruited in the same way that the Reagan Administration
founded and financed "right-wing execution squads in El Salvador").
269. James Risen & David Johnston, Threats and Responses: Hunt for al Qaeda; Bush
has Widened Authority of Cl.A. to Kill Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.nytimes.corn/2002/ 12/ 15/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-al-qaeda-bush-haswidened-authori ty-cia-kil l.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013); Brian Whitaker & Oliver
Burkeman, Killing Probes the Frontiers of Robotics and Legality, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6,
2002), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/06/usa.alqaida (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013) (reporting that Anna Lindh, the Swedish foreign minister, called such
assassinations "a summary execution that violates human rights").
270. McCOY, supra note 49, at 116-17; Bejesky, Sensibly Construing, supra note 135,
at 1-3, 6-10.
271. Geneva Protocol Additional, supra note 27, art. 75; Symposium, Left Out in the
Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America, 57 AM. U.
L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2008); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1450 (2008).
272. Khan, supra note 20, at 6-7.
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expected that the detainee will be tortured, and Congress must approve
of rendition programs. 273 Orders to engage in abusive interrogations
began secretly and from the beginning, it seemed that the assumption
274
was that lawmakers and the public had no right to know.
CIA Director Tenet reportedly went to the White House to attain
approval to permit minute details of interrogation to protect agents from
criminal prosecution275 and Bush purportedly exempted the CIA from
military rules on interrogation after 9/11 under the rationale that
"certain terrorists might have information that might save American
lives" and even noted that criminal law restrictions could be avoided in
specific circumstances. 276 The problem with the requests and assumed
legitimacy of exemptions is that the President does not have the
authority to grant another government agency the right to violate
criminal law or human rights law, particularly if methods approved rise
to the level of torture or a jus cogens violation, or the right to exempt an
277
agency from international laws that are binding inside a war zone,
which is also unrelated to protecting American civilians from terrorist
attacks.
After operations were executed, secrecy undermined criminal
justice processes in the two high-profile and rare prosecutions. In 2006,
CIA contract employee David A. Passaro was convicted of assault for
the death of Afghan detainee Abdul W ali in June 2003. 278 At the
beginning of the trial, Passaro sought to introduce classified memos and
emails and to subpoena CIA officials to prove that CIA superiors
directed and approved of abusive practices, but the judge denied his
273. Bejesky, Sensibly Construing, supra note 135, at 10-12.
274. ARNOVE, supra note 262, at 26 (testifying before a joint House and Senate
intelligence committee hearing, Cofer Black, the head of the CIA's Counterterrorism
Center, claimed that "operational flexibility" was needed in dealing with suspected terrorists
and stated: "This is a very highly classified area, but I have to say that all you need to know:
There was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11 ... After 9/11 the gloves come off.");
CIA Interrogation Techniques: What Did Congress Know, CNN, (Dec. 13, 2007), available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0712/13/ltm.02.html (last visited on Nov. 19,
2013) (stating that sometime in 2002, four Congresspersons on the SSCI were the first to be
informed that the CIA would be engaging in an operation involving harsh interrogation
methods to attain information from captives).
275. Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 45
(2008).
276. Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 236.
277. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 829-36; See supra Part II.
278. Gregory P. Bailey, Note, United States v. Passaro: Exercising Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Over Non-Defense Department Government Contractors Committing Crimes
Overseas Under the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States, 58
CATH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1157-59 (2009).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/3

60

Bejesky: How the Commander in Chief's "Call for Papers" Veils a Path Depen

2013]

Path Dependent Result of Torture

61

request in a closed hearing on the basis of protecting state secrets. 279
Passaro claimed that the Bush Administration was classifying
everything, and that the judge did not know any better than to deny
requests to documents that the Bush Administration classified, which
included decisive evidence. 280 Likewise, Corporal Charles Graner was
convicted for his role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, and Graner appealed
on the basis that there was an order for a "suspension" of war crime
laws for the American military, 281 which does not seem illogical with
today's knowledge of the loophole legal opinions that were issued by
advisors. 282
The state secrets doctrine has questionable legitimacy, 283
particularly when government directives were implemented and there
are questions of fact over whether those orders led to detainee deaths
and severe abuse, but pertinent government documents are classified
and treated as "secret" information. The state secrets privilege is a
common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to "block
discovery in a lawsuit of any information that, if disclosed, would
adversely affect national security, " 284 but it should not routinely prevail
over a criminal defendant's assertion to obtain classified materials
unless the classified document's evidentiary value to the accused is
"clearly negligible." 285 Nonetheless, both Passaro and Granier defended
279. Ryan P. Logan, Note, The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: Embodying U.S.
Values to Eliminate Detainee Abuse by Civilian Contractors and Bounty Hunters in
Afghanistan and Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1605, 1635 (2006); Judge Denies Ex-CIA
Contractor Access to Classified Documents, WRAL.COM (Aug. 3, 2006), available at
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1091970/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
280. Logan, supra note 279, at 1633-34.
281. Dan Eggen & Josh White, Administration Asserted a Terror Exception on Search
and Seizure, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/03/AR2008040304 l 36.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
282. Scott Horton, A Nuremberg Lesson, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2005), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jan/20/opinion/oe-horton20 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013)
(Gonzales stating that "the Geneva Convention was 'obsolete' when it came to the war on
terror."). Abu Ghraib was in Iraq, but the directives that were issued for Iraq also did not
effectively respect the Geneva Conventions. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note
19, at 22-31.
283. LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006); Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and
Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1933 (2007) (contending that the state
secret' s doctrine weakens congressional and judicial oversight of the executive).
284. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Reynolds v. United
States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the
National Security or Immunity for the Executive, 91 YALE L.J. 570 (1982).
285. United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (citing
Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938)).
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by contending that they were acting on orders of superiors and both
claims were rejected, with Passaro' s claim being rejected specifically
because the memos he wanted to introduce as evidence were classified
and protected from disclosure under "national security. " 286 By April
2008, 22 out of 24 civil cases of alleged abuse by civilian employees
and contractors were dropped by the Justice Department, and they may
have been dropped substantially due to the defenses advanced by legal
advisors. 287 It appears that advisory memos were classified to protect
the administration and diffuse attention from scandal.
C. Using Secrecy to Hide Legal Advice
Over two years after the invasion of Afghanistan, classified
legal advisory memos periodically emerged. 288 The Justice Department
Office of Professional Responsibility later investigated and provided a
rather astounding explanation, which was that there were very few
recipients of the legal memoranda because of "the limited number of
security clearances granted to review the materials," that "[t]his denial
of clearances to individuals who routinely handle highly classified
materials has never been explained satisfactorily," and that the denial
"represented a departure from OLC's traditional practices of widely
circulating drafts of important opinions for comment. " 289 Professor
Jack Goldsmith, the new head of the OLC after Bybee, acknowledged
the secrecy and "limited readership" and stated that other departments,
such as the State Department, were expected to object to the opinions. 290
For example, when pressed about specific legal device,
Gonzales explained that he renounced advice imparted in one of the
memos and would review other opinions issued by the OLC (or "John
Yoo"), but also mentioned that the document in question was not
scheduled to be declassified until 2012. 291 Another memo written by

286. United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 220 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that the trial
court "admitted some of the evidence in full, admitted some in redacted form, and excluded
some as irrelevant, cumulative, or corroborative," which was not an abuse of discretion).
287. Eggen & White, supra note 281, at A04.
288. Michael Isikoff, Double Standards?, NEWSWEEK (May 21, 2004), available at
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard. php?az=view_ all&address= 103x5
2175 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
289. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 260.
290. GOLDSMITH, supra note 243, at 167; Neil Kinkopf, Is it Better to be Loved or
Feared? Some Thoughts on Lessons Learned From the Presidency of George W. Bush, 4
DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. PoL'Y 45, 46 (2009) (stating that "Administration officials
deliberated only among themselves: not publicly and not with Congress").
291. Allen & Schmidt, supra note 57, at AO 1.
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Yoo and dated March 14, 2003 was eighty-one pages and not
declassified until March 31, 2008. 292 In July 2011, Human Rights
Watch noted that top officials should be investigated and prosecuted if
evidence warrants it, but pointed out that a main impediment to
gathering evidence is that much information, internal memoranda,
directives, and advisory memos remained classified. 293
With respect to the details of the authorized interrogation methods,
Gonzales contended in written responses for his confirmation hearings
for Attorney General that he could not reveal "exceptional" Top Secret
interrogation standards or practices because disclosure "would fairly
rapidly provide al-Qaeda with a road map concerning the interrogation
that captured terrorists can expect to face and would enable al-Qaeda to
improve its counter-interrogation training to match it."294 This was not
a very compelling explanation because the general methods of
interrogation had been known for decades and were denounced by the
international community. 295
Despite the fact that Bush and other top officials kept issuing
orders for interrogation consistent with the legal advice, 296 classifying
memoranda, and facing criticism by claiming that interrogators were
ordered to remain within U.S. law, Gonzales oddly explained: "I don't
believe the President had access to any legal opinions from the
292. See van Aggelen, supra note 108 (referencing Memorandum from John Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel
of the Dep't of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003).
293. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 2; Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane,
Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17 /us/politics/17detain.html?_r=O (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013) (announcing the release of four new "detailed memos describing
brutal interrogation techniques"). Recent investigations assessed the professional and ethical
conduct of the lawyers as licensed attorneys, but Yoo's attorneys responded that the State
Bar of Pennsylvania, his state of licensure, has a four-year statute of limitations for the
advice in question, which had already expired. Miguel A. Estrada of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Response to the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Professional
Responsibility
Final
Report,
at
4
(July
29,
2009),
available
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20100220JUSTICE/20100220JUSTICEYooResponse.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
294. Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Says '02 Policy on Detainees Doesn't Bind CIA, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
19,
2005),
available
at
http://www.nytimes,com/2005/01 I 19/politics/ 19gonzales.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
295. Bejesky, Utilitarian Rational Choice, supra note 3, at 405-11 (explaining that the
details of the CIA's Kubark interrogation manual (1963) could have been downloaded from
the Internet, the methods were in findings and holdings of the ECHR case involving British
abuse of Irish detainees in Northern Ireland, and waterboarding had been known of and
condemned as war crimes since World War 11.); see supra Part III(F)(3)(5).
296. Bejesky, Abu Ghraib Convictions, supra note 19, at 22-30.
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Department of Justice. " 297 How could Bush and appointees possibly
issue orders and publicly claim that those tasked with carrying out
directives were not violating law if he was not privy to the content of
the memos? 298 The directives that were issued were considered illegal
and unconstitutional to an overwhelming percentage of Americans, the
legal profession, and the rest of the world, 299 but the White House hid
behind the advice of four attorneys who kept issuing opinions to each
other, and top Bush Administration officials kept classifying the
memos. These top officials hid behind select legal memos in the same
manner that they hid behind "intelligence information" to make their
claims to invade Iraq. 300 The secrecy also caused chagrin for the U.S.
military.

D. Using Secrecy that Compromised Military Responsibilities
The legal advice from Bush Administration lawyers placed the
military in a precarious situation because military officials were also
implementing directives and managing detention facilities, but military
officials and attorneys were either substantially unaware of the legal
advice that sanctioned levels of abuse or their objections were
ignored. 301 The Schlesinger Report, which studied interrogation and
297. Adam Liptak, Author of '02 Memo on Torture: Gentle Soul for a Harsh Topic,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/24/world/reachwar-legal-advice-author-02-memo-torture-gentle-soul-for-harshtopic.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
298. Steven R. Weisman & Joel Brinkley, Rice Sees Iraq Training Progress But Offers
No Schedule for Exit: Senate Democrats Confront Nominee at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
at
available
2005),
19,
http:/!query .nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05EED B 133 8F93AA257 52COA9639C8
863 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (noting that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained
that "the determination of whether interrogation techniques are consistent with our
international obligations and American law are made by the Justice Department").
299. Bejesky, Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-29; see supra Part IV(A).
300. See generally Robert Bejesky, The SSC/ Investigation of the Iraq War: Part II:
Politicization of Intelligence, 40 S.U. L. REV. 243 (2013); Bejesky, Intelligence Information,
supra note 176, at 875-82.
301. Graham, supra note 149, at 77 (stating that "there was no extensive legal debate,
even within the Pentagon, concerning these interrogation methods," and that "[m]any, if not
most, attorneys within the building were completely unaware that these methods had been
approved"); Victor Hansen, A Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,
50 S. TEX. L. REV. 617, 638 (2009) (a small circle of advisors shut JAGs out of the process).
Rear Admiral Don Guter, a former Navy JAG officer, explained that "[i]f we-we being the
uniformed lawyers-that is, the lawyers who are in the U.S. military-had been listened to
and what we said put into practice, then these abuses would not have occurred." Senator
Harry Reid, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Statement on Nomination of Alberto Gonzales
(Feb. 3, 2005), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2005/02/03/reid-statement-on-
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detention abuse, states that the Secretary of Defense should have used
"the legal resources of the Services' Judge Advocates and General
Counsels" and obtained "a wider range of legal opinions and a more
robust debate regarding detainee policy and operations." 302
Had the Bush Administration not hid legal advice as classified
national security secrets, military attorneys may have had more of a
reasonable opportunity to voice objections. However, a competing
position is that JAG attorneys and the military generally did not need to
be consulted and were not empowered to challenge the standards. 303
Professors Yoo and Sulmasy wrote an article that challenged the
contention that JAG attorneys should have provided legal counsel on
detention and interrogation methods because doing so would have
violated constitutional restrictions that ensure that there is civilian
control over the military, enter JAG attorneys into domains in which
they do not normally provide advice, and involve military lawyers in
legal consultation when the "war on terror" was different from previous
wars. 304
Yoo and Sulmasy's contention that JAG attorneys might cause a
separation of powers dilemma by "resisting civilian policy choices" is
theoretically reasonable,3° 5 but JAG attorneys are also mandated by
their professional obligations to impart advice on combat and related

nomination-of-alberto-gonzales/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). There was some high-level
military consideration because Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora expressed his concerns
three times to Haynes during December 2002 and January 2003 and believed that
interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay may be torture. SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at xxi; SANDS, supra note 63, at 139-40 (noting that there were
warnings). However, Haynes was one of the four prime legal advisers who issued opinions
that were condemned by scholars.
302. SCHLESINGER, supra note 175, at 36.
303.
In March 2003, a Department of Defense Working Group issued
recommendations for interrogation and opined what level of abuse would constitute torture
under international law. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197. The military was instructed to
accept the legal standards set by the Attorney General's Office of Legal Counsel. Detention
Policies and Military Justice: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Personnel of the S.
Comm. of Armed Services, 109th Cong. 15 (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 197, at
24 (noting that "in wartime, it is for the President alone to decide what methods to use to
best prevail against the enemy"). Orders consistent with OLC advice were applied in
Afghanistan and Iraq. FAY, supra note 206, at 24-25; MAJ. GEN. GEOFFREY MILLER,
ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN
IRAQ 2 (2003).
304. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1818-23, 1842-43
(2007); Hansen, supra note 301, at 639 (disagreeing with Sulmasy and Yoo and noting that
the authors exhibit a lack of understanding over the U.S. Constitutional structure).
305. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 304, at 1834.
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concerns to commanders on a regular basis 306 and avert military
personnel from violating criminal laws. 307 Foremost consternation
arose over whether to extend Geneva Convention Prisoner of War
protections to detainees, such as for alleged members of the Taliban and
al-Qaeda; 308 and whether crimes under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice were committed, such as murder, manslaughter, maltreatment,
battery, and assault. 309
In the capacity of legal advisor, there is no need to be overlyrestrictive310 and oppose the government's preference, assuming the
legal advisor offers reasonable advice. 311 Perhaps there is a threshold
306. Laura Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and the Problem of
International Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 355 (2010) (article devoted to
discussions with JAG attorneys and depicting that they are consulted daily on numerous
legal issues relating to combat and operations); Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 304, at 1835-36
(stating that there are elevated concerns for legal doctrine during combat).
307. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REGULATION 27-26, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
LAWYERS, R. l.13(c) (1992), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r27_26.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("If a lawyer for the Army knows that an officer ... is engaged
in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is either
a violation of a legal obligation to the Army or a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the Army the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest
of the Army."); Kramer & Schmitt, supra note 228, at 1426.
308. Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in the War on Terrorism,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, at summary (Jan. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31 36701132005.pdf
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014) (stating that foreigners and human rights organizations have
been especially critical of the denial of POW status to all combatants and that "[t]he
publication of executive branch memoranda document[ ed] the internal debate about the
status of prisoners").
309. 10 U.S.C. §§ 893, 918, 919, 928 (2010).
310. John Yoo, A Crucial Look at Torture Law, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2004), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/06/opinion/oe-yoo6 (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("A
lawyer must not read the law to be more restrictive than it is just to satisfy his own moral
goals, to prevent diplomatic backlash or to advance the cause of international human rights
law."). With respect to reciprocal obligations among states, such as to fulfill human rights
standards that are binding on all governments, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that a treaty is to be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1). It does not say "treaties should be interpreted in light of every
possible loophole, excuse, exception, and rationalization that can be conjured to avoid the
object and purpose of the treaty." The Convention further states that the ordinary meaning
of a treaty should be followed unless the meaning is "ambiguous or obscure" or "leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Id. art. 32. It does not say that "a
government should adopt manifestly absurd and unreasonable interpretations of human
rights treaties to make the ordinary meaning of the treaty ambiguous or obscure." Id.
311. Barron & Lederman, supra note 31, at 985-87, 998, 1006-07, 1015-17, 1031,
1037-38, 1042, 1044-45, 1055, 1059-60, 1067-68, 1075, 1078, 1083, 1091 (noting that the

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/3

66

Bejesky: How the Commander in Chief's "Call for Papers" Veils a Path Depen

Path Dependent Result of Torture

2013]

67

up to which advice should be assumed to be objective, but when
opinions exceed this threshold of reasonableness with loopholes and
technicalities that dismiss more orthodox interpretations of the law so to
promote preferences of the government client, it seems highly probable
that the advice could contort the view of the best interest of the ultimate
client-the American public.
V.

CONCLUSIONS ON PATH DEPENDENCE

This article maintains that human rights abuses might have been
virtually inevitable as a path dependent outcome based on the Bush
Administration's assumption of ubiquitous peril, open invitation to
justify its policy preferences when it requested legal memos, and control
over the national security apparatus. Several appointed legal advisers,
who were prone to appease, 312 produced advice with loopholes 313 that
contended the President has an all-puissant Commander in Chief
authority that permits ignoring binding treaties and customary
international law, that necessity and self-defense formed exigency to
nullify laws that would otherwise restrict interrogations, that
Afghanistan was a "failed state" without a lawful government, that
distinctively classifying combatants and torture meant that detainees
could be interrogated, and that the Taliban was more like a "militant,
terrorist group" than a formal military.
Effectively, the Bush
Administration "construct[ed] a judicially-endorsed practice of
permissible torture" 314 and hid the advice that contended how directives
would be legal. Ironically enough, the approach of hiding information
in the past, the Attorney General's office did impart diversity in opinions and did not always
aggrandized executive war power).
312. Legal memos were written by OLC lawyers with "clear Republican credentials
and affiliations," and those who reviewed the memoranda were "all Republican-appointed
or at least Republican-affiliated officials." David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119
YALE L.J. 548, 606 (2009); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (2007)
(calling the memos advocacy briefs rather than objective opinions).
313. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the
Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 355 (2007) (opining that
legal advisors intentionally produced "forward-leaning" memos to "see how far the CIA and
the military could go without breaking the law, and how far the law could be stretched to
move the line farther forward still"); Vanessa Blum, Culture of Yes: Signing Off on a
Strategy, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 1 ("Guided by a determination to prevent another
terrorist attack on U.S. soil, strong loyalty to the president, and in some cases an ideological
disdain for international law, government attorneys sought ways to justify White House
policies in the war on terror, much as a corporate lawyer might exploit loopholes in the tax
code.").
314. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the 'Ticking Bomb, ' in THE TORTURE
DEBATE In AMERICA 71 (Karen J. Greenberg, ed. 2006).
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in the national security apparatus, promoting a public agenda, and then
using the national security apparatus as a scapegoat, was frightfully
similar to the Bush Administration's false claims that led to the war in
Iraq. 315
The Bush Administration endowed American agents with a
to engage in the widespread use of interrogation methods that
right
legal
316
resulted in torture, kidnapping, unlawful detentions, and even deaths;
318
knew of the abuse; 317 promoted legal advisors when they could have

315. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 176, at 875-82. In one specific
piece of key information, the CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence requested analysts to
write a "murky" paper to "lean far forward and do a speculative piece" and if you were to
"stretch to the maximum the evidence you had, what could you come up with?" SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. SENATE, REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S
PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, s. REP. No. 108-301, at 306-07 (2004)
(committee staff interview with CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence). The paper's scope
note affirmed that it was "purposely aggressive in seeking to draw connections" and written
for White House "senior policymaker interest in a comprehensive assessment of Iraqi links
to al-Qa'ida." Id. at 305-07. Congressman Peter Hoekstra places blame on the intelligence
hierarchy: "I think you've got a systemic problem here. I think the [intelligence]
community is incompetent. It is arrogant . . . [I]t's become political." Transcript: Reps.
Harman, Hoekstra on 'FNS', Fox NEWS (Dec. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,317011,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). The
Bush Administration regarded the information, much of it rumors, as serious in making
threat claims to the American public. Robert Bejesky, The SSC! Investigation of the Iraq
War: Part I: A Split Decision, 40 S.U. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2012); Bejesky, Intelligence
Information, supra note 176, at 859-63; Bejesky, CFP, supra note 110, at 22-29. The war
may have cost American taxpayers upwards of $3 trillion. See generally, JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE
IRAQ CONFLICT (W. W. Norton & Company ed., 2008).
316. ARNOVE, supra note 262, at 18-24; McCOY, supra note 49, at 116; Bejesky,
Pruning, supra note 4, at 823-36 (citing scholars contending that it is rather probable that
the Bush Administration committed crimes).
317. Leila Nadya Sadat, International Legal Issues Surrounding the Mistreatment of
Iraqi Detainees by American Forces, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 2004), available at
http://www.tjsl.edu/slomansonb/AbuGhraib.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (noting that
abuses were generally known by top officials who could have prevented the abuses).
318. McCOY, supra note 49, at 160 ("[The] Bush administration's torture advocates
strut across television screens and down the corridors of power," operate above the law, and
the chief architects and policy-makers of the memos that protect the torturers from criminal
prosecution have almost all been promoted by Bush.); Diane Marie Amann, Application of
the Constitution to Guantanamo Bay: Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. Rev. 2085, 2086 (2005)
("A few soldiers were prosecuted for detainee abuse, but generals implicated in government
reports were not, and high-ranking civilians won promotion."). Bush appointed, and the
Republican-controlled Congress confirmed Gonzales as attorney general after asking a few
questions about interrogation memos. Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 236. Bybee
was also rewarded for "torturing the law" by being appointed a federal judge. Alvarez,
supra note 47, at 197 n. 83.
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been conspirators in war crimes; 319 and even responded to detainee
attempts to attain legal redress as "lawfare" and international "judicial
processes" that are "strategies of the weak" that undermine "[ o]ur
Meanwhile, Yoo and Bybee
strength as a nation state. " 320
acknowledged that interrogators would be relying on their advice, 321 but
it is highly unlikely that a prosecutor would indict when there is a
Justice Department opinion that authorizes the practices, 322 which can
politicize the justice system. 323
IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 133-35 (citing Marjorie Cohn,
Indictment, MARJORIE COHN (Jan. 10, 2005), available at
http: //www.marjoriecohn.com/2005/01 /gonzales-indictment.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2013)); David M. Brahms et al., An Open Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, GLOBAL
SECURITY, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/senatejudiciary-committee-letter_03jan2005.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (a group of military
officials expressing their concern about Gonzales's nomination because of his influence on
supporting human rights violating interrogation and detention methods); van Aggelen, supra
note 108, at 22.
320. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
6
(2005),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy .pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2013). The term "lawfare" was offered as a means of describing reliance on legal means to
confront national security issues instead of by military force, and that the U.S. has
traditionally relied on defensive lawfare. Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare and U.S. National
Security, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 393, 394, 399, 401 (2010); DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR
AND LA w 116 (2006) ("Law now offers an institutional and doctrinal space for transforming
the boundaries of war into strategic assets, as well as a vernacular for legitimating and
denouncing what happens in war."). The fear is that an enemy could use the U.S.'s strong
legal system against us. Fred K. Ford, Keeping Boumediene off the Battlefield: Examining
Potential Implications of the Boumediene v. Bush Decision to the Conduct of the United
States Military Operations, 30 PACE L. REV. 396, 401 (2010). Abused detainees could
allegedly wage "lawfare" against the United States. Michael J. Frank, U.S. Military Courts
and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 645, 65 l (2006) (noting that
"[u]nfortunately, the United States has not fully taken advantage of and enjoyed the fruits
that can be reaped from the prosecution of war criminals, particularly with respect to
terrorists operating in the Iraqi theatre of operations" which "is due in part to the effects of
the lawfare being waged against the United States with respect to the prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba").
321. THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel ed., 2005) (referencing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney Gen, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to President (Aug. 1, 2002)).
322. Clarke, supra note 275, at 46; William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists,
Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1455-56 (2008) (noting that it
was "extraordinary" that Gonzales claimed "that the government has the legal authority to
prosecute journalists for publishing classified information," such as those related to torture
and other scandals).
323. In another example, in late 2006, individuals at the Department of Justice forced
out several prosecutors in an effort to "manipulate prosecutorial decisions in an effort to
entrench their political allies;" but "[t]he White House, of course, denied any involvement."
Eric Lane, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Emily Berman, Too Big a Canon in the
319.

The

Gonzales
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In April 2008, after legal memos were successively issued for
six years, the Justice Department finally decided to commence an
investigation into whether its officials were improperly advising Bush
and top White House officials on issues related to international law,
wartime authority, and laws governing torture. 324 One month later,
fifty-six members of Congress sent a letter to Attorney General Michael
Mukasey, Bush's new appointee, to choose a special counsel to
investigate whether top Bush Administration officials committed crimes
by authorizing harsh interrogation techniques. 325 It is difficult to
cogitate what is left to investigate after years of assiduous work by the
ACLU, numerous human rights groups, courageous dissenting officials,
a dozen military investigations, and the Bush Administration's own
admissions. 326 Even former President Jimmy Carter expressed whether
he believed that the Bush Administration issued policies that tortured
prisoners in violation of international treaties, and he stated: "I don't
think it. I know it." 327 With reference to the Bush Administration's
contention that the "Geneva Convention do not apply to those people in
Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo," Carter further explicated that the
assertion seems to assume that "we can torture prisoners and deprive
them of an accusation of a crime to which they are accused ... [Y]ou
can make your own definition of human rights and say we don't violate
them, and you can make your own definition of torture and say we don't
violate them." 328

President's Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 73 7,
770 (2010). Congressional investigations revealed that White House officials did play an
active role in the firings, and there was "politicization of the American criminal justice
system." Id. at 770 -71.
324. Lara Jakes Jordan, Justice Department Investigating 2003 Torture Memo,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.chron.com/news/nationworld/article/J ustice-Department-investigating-2003-torture-memo-164 7 622. php
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2013).
325. JOHN CONYERS, JR., REINING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND
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